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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Political, cultural, and religious groups around the world have 
sought in recent decades to exercise their rights to self-
determination. Examples include indigenous peoples in Australia 
and Canada, Native Americans, ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, 
the Amish community in Pennsylvania, and the Orthodox Jewish 
community of Kiryas Joel. Responding to these efforts, legal scholars 
and policymakers are today attempting to develop legal mechanisms 
that would accommodate the unique interests of particular groups, 
while also mediating and settling potential conflicts and tensions be-
tween individuals, groups, and peoples. In this Article, I seek to add 
a historical dimension to these endeavors by examining early twenti-
eth-century theories of pluralism1 that are rich, complex, and highly 
relevant to these contemporary discussions of group rights, but that 
thus far have been neglected by political scientists and legal scholars. 
 In contemporary political science and legal scholarship, the term 
“pluralism” is often associated with process theories of democracy, 
which scholars like Robert Dahl articulated during the 1950s and 
1960s. Rooted in models of equilibrium drawn from economics, proc-
ess theories sought to create a conception of a neutral political proc-
ess, free of any substantive commitment to particular values such as 
the celebration of diversity, in which different groups interact, com-
pete, or trade ends.2 This common association of “pluralism” with 
process theories is misleading. In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, theories of pluralism often recognized diversity not merely as 
an empirical fact, something that we must tolerate grudgingly or try 
to reduce, but as a constitutive element of American democracy. Ac-
cordingly, the extent to which laws and policies sought to accommo-
date and promote diverse group interests, beyond the sheer recogni-
tion of their existence, reflected a nation’s commitment to democratic 
values.3 
 Given the recent rise in the number of groups seeking to exercise 
their rights to self-determination, the message of these early theories 
of pluralism, with their thick conception of democracy, warrants seri-
                                                                                                                    
 1. I use the term “pluralism” as a noun to refer to a commitment to devising a plural 
polity. As I suggest in this Article, in particular historical moments, individuals assigned 
different meanings to such a commitment. Hence, when I refer to interpretations of plural-
ism, or to models of pluralism, I am concerned with changing understandings of the com-
mitment to devising a plural polity, or with different models that sought to create such a 
polity. 
 2. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinaf-
ter DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967) [hereinafter DAHL, PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES]; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 251-58 (1992).   
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
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ous consideration. This Article begins to do so by “siting” pluralism. 
It locates three models of pluralism, which I label “socialist plural-
ism,” “systematic pluralism,” and “comparative pluralism,” within a 
particular attempt to devise a plural polity, and grounds each model 
in the changing ideologies4 of the historical agent who developed 
them.5 The particular attempt is federal Indian policy during the 
1930s and 1940s, a period commonly labeled the “Indian New Deal.” 
The historical agent is Felix Solomon Cohen, who was the chief legal 
architect of federal Indian policy during the New Deal and who is 
also recognized today as one of the most important legal philosophers 
in the first half of the twentieth century.6 
 Federal Indian policy at the turn of the twentieth century sought 
to break down tribal organization and force all Indians7 to assimilate, 
particularly through the distribution of communal lands to individ-
ual owners.8 The essence of the Indian New Deal, at least as federal 
policymakers described it, was to stop allotment and assimilation by 
delegating to Indian tribes more authority over their economic, so-
cial, cultural, and political affairs.9 Cohen joined the Department of 
the Interior in 1933 to help draft the Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA),10 which initiated the Indian New Deal by creating a procedure 
to re-establish tribal governments on Indian reservations.11 Many 
present-day tribal governments were formed under the IRA.12 While 
in office, Cohen authored the Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
                                                                                                                    
 4. By ideology, I mean the structure of ideas and beliefs—about right and wrong, 
about the meaning of democracy, about the goals of national policy—that influences an ac-
tor’s understanding of reality. For a similar definition, see ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL 
TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 
xiii (2000). 
 5. This Article is part of a larger project in which I examine the development of theo-
ries of pluralism in the twentieth century, the interdependence of the different meanings 
attributed to pluralism in distinct historical moments, and the relationship between theo-
ries of pluralism and the emergence of the modern welfare state. 
 6. For discussions of Cohen’s legal philosophy, see HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 183; 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 86 (1997); Joel R. 
Cornwell, From Hedonism to Human Rights: Felix Cohen’s Alternative to Nihilism, 68 
TEMPLE L. REV. 197 (1995); and Martin P. Golding, Realism and Functionalism in the Le-
gal Thought of Felix S. Cohen, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1031 (1982). For Cohen’s writings, see 
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS BY FELIX S. COHEN (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 
1960) [hereinafter THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE].  
 7. Given the historical nature of this Article, I use the terms “Indian” and “Indian 
tribes” rather than “Native Americans” or “Indian nations.” 
 8. See infra Part II.B.  
 9. See infra Part III.C. 
 10. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79); see also 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 223-25 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 
2000) (1975) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY]. 
 11. § 16, 48 Stat. at 987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476); see also 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 224-25. 
 12. E.g., RUSCO, supra note 4, at ix. 
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(Handbook),13 the first comprehensive treatise on Indian law. In 
1946, a year before he left the Department, Cohen helped to draft the 
Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA),14 which established a com-
mission to settle tribal land claims against the federal government.15 
Today, similar claims are litigated around the world by indigenous 
peoples. 
 While Cohen’s contributions to federal Indian law have been 
widely acknowledged, thus far no one has attempted to place them 
within the history of pluralism. In a forthcoming book, I argue that 
Cohen lived a life dedicated to the celebration of pluralism.16 Cohen’s 
jurisprudence and legal practice must thus be understood in relation 
to theories of pluralism.17 His view or interpretation of pluralism was 
fluid. At times it stood for the protection and accommodation of a va-
riety of economic, social, political, and cultural interests. At others, it 
was a philosophical attitude that urged the understanding of reality 
as a variety of interdependent contexts and that celebrated the in-
completeness of human knowledge. In still other moments, Cohen 
recognized the plurality of value systems and sought to devise 
mechanisms that would allow translation between distinct systems. 
The three models of pluralism examined in this Article were devised 
by Cohen during the New Deal. Using Cohen’s legal work, his writ-
ings, and his correspondence, this Article investigates the Indian 
New Deal as a site for the evolution of competing meanings of plural-
ism and explicates the complex legal, intellectual, and personal as-
sumptions that informed them.18 
                                                                                                                    
 13. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (U.S. G.P.O. ed., 1941) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
 14. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). The ICCA was formerly codified at sections 70-70v-
3 of the United States Code, until omitted from the Code upon termination of the Commis-
sion on September 30, 1978. Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465, § 2, 90 Stat. 1990 (pro-
viding for the dissolution of the Commission); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 231-33. 
 15. § 1, 60 Stat. at 1049; see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, su-
pra note 10, at 232. 
 16. DALIA TSUK, ENCOUNTERS WITH PLURALISM: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF FELIX S. 
COHEN (forthcoming). 
 17. For an earlier attempt to assess the impact of Cohen’s philosophy on his legal 
work, see Stephen M. Feldman, Felix S. Cohen and his Jurisprudence: Reflections on Fed-
eral Indian Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 479 (1986). Feldman argues that Cohen’s work on 
the Handbook reflected his legal realist philosophy. For a more recent attempt, see Jill E. 
Martin, The Miner’s Canary: Felix S. Cohen’s Philosophy of Indian Rights, 23 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 165 (1998-99). To the best of my knowledge, thus far no one has attempted to dis-
cern the relationship between Cohen’s philosophy and legal practice and the history of 
American pluralism. Nor has anyone sought to determine the relationship between 
Cohen’s political and personal aspirations and his work on federal Indian law. 
 18. Cohen’s changing interpretations of pluralism were mediated through his per-
sonal experience as a son of a Jewish immigrant, his political involvement with the social-
ist movement, his intellectual fascination with legal realism, his professional role in the 
Department of the Interior, and his reaction to World War II and its aftermath. All of these 
2001]  AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 193 
 
 Contemporary scholars diverge in their assessment of the Indian 
New Deal.19 For some scholars, the New Deal was another period in 
the history of colonization. New Dealers20 were, accordingly, white 
imperialists imposing their theoretical framework on Indians.21 Simi-
lar concerns are raised today with respect to any attempt to use the 
sovereign state to liberate indigenous peoples or to devise a plural 
polity.22 For other scholars, the Indian New Deal reflected a genuine 
attempt to establish self-governing Indian communities that failed 
due to political compromises and the policy of termination that was 
adopted during the 1950s.23  
 Rather than assessing either position, I limit my discussion to the 
relationship between Cohen’s work on federal Indian policy and his 
shifting interpretations of pluralism. I make no claim about other in-
dividual, social, or political forces that played a role in shaping fed-
eral Indian policy during the New Deal, about other pluralists, or 
about additional intellectual traditions that informed Cohen’s work. 
Nor do I purport to provide a complete historical narrative of the 
events. For one thing, the voices of Indian tribes are conspicuously 
absent from this account, though Indians were hardly passive recipi-
ents of federal legislation, and their voices are clearly important to 
evaluating the successes and failures of the New Deal.24 My focus is 
Cohen’s changing theories of pluralism. I examine how these theories 
affected Cohen’s understanding of his task and how they changed in 
the course of his interaction with Indian tribes.  
                                                                                                                    
aspects are more fully developed in Encounters with Pluralism: The Life and Thought of 
Felix S. Cohen. TSUK, supra note 16. 
 19. See generally RUSCO, supra note 4, at ix-xiv. 
 20. The term “New Dealers” in this Article refers to officials in the Department of the 
Interior, particularly those in the Solicitor’s Office, who administered the Indian New 
Deal. 
 21. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of 
Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963 (1996). 
 22. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Eth-
nic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615 (1992); S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian 
People and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing 
Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309 (1994); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Current Development: United 
Nations Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and States, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 599 (1989); Rebecca 
Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cul-
tural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583 (1999); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal 
Thought III: Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining 
the Terms of Indigenous Peoples Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660. 
 23. For these diverse opinions, see INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST HAND ACCOUNTS OF 
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1995) [here-
inafter INDIAN SELF-RULE]; and THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, 
COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE STATE OF 
NATIVE AMERICA]; and compare Deloria, supra note 21, to VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE 
TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 187-206 (1985). 
 24. See generally RUSCO, supra note 4.  
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 For Cohen, the IRA, the Handbook, and the ICCA reflected differ-
ent models for devising a plural polity, that is, socialist pluralism, 
systematic pluralism, and comparative pluralism, respectively.25 By 
exploring the Indian New Deal as a site for the evolution of theories 
of pluralism, this Article calls attention to an important chapter in 
the modern narrative of pluralism, a period that is also significant in 
the life of Felix Cohen and in the history of federal Indian law. By 
investigating the intellectual and personal assumptions underlying 
the three models that Cohen developed during the New Deal, this Ar-
ticle further shows that models of pluralism, and laws that are in-
formed by them, are more than means for devising a plural polity. 
They are sites for the construction and negotiation of cultural, social, 
and political ideologies and for the assertion and reconfiguration of 
identity.26 By siting pluralism, I also hope this Article offers insights 
from history about the assumptions, possibilities, and difficulties as-
sociated with attempts to devise legal mechanisms that would cele-
brate cultural, political, and religious diversity.27  
 Part II provides the intellectual and legal background for the 
story of pluralism, Cohen, and the New Deal. It surveys the emer-
gence of theories of pluralism, particularly cultural and political plu-
ralism, during the turn of the twentieth century. Cohen’s personal 
and intellectual attraction to theories of pluralism brought him to the 
New Deal. These theories provided him with tools for evaluating 
what he saw on the eve of the New Deal as the devastating impact of 
federal Indian policy. They also shaped the intellectual framework 
within which he worked to devise policies that arguably sought to 
improve the situation by transferring to Indian tribes more authority 
over their cultural, economic, and political affairs. 
 Part III focuses on “socialist pluralism”—Cohen’s initial model for 
devising a plural polity. Cohen’s socialist pluralism was grounded in 
                                                                                                                    
 25. These models did not explicitly address the relationship between groups and indi-
viduals within and outside group boundaries. Thus, although the relationship between 
groups and individuals is always implicit in discussions of the status of collective entities, I 
do not expressly examine this issue in this Article. See also infra Part III.B.  
 26. This is not to suggest that only ideologies and conceptions of identity affected the 
outcomes of the Indian New Deal. As will be developed in the Article, political compromises 
and constraints derived from the nature of legislative processes were as important. I focus, 
nonetheless, on ideologies and conceptions of identity.  
 27. While the Indian New Deal is the site discussed in this Article, I wish to empha-
size that my focus is the history of pluralism. The models that Cohen devised were im-
printed upon federal Indian law. Yet, they were not necessarily effective on Indian reserva-
tions. Cf. Feldman, supra note 17, at 518-24 (discussing Cohen’s legal realist plans going 
awry); Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition: Soifer on Law, 
Pluralism and Group Identity, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 359 (1997) (discussing the unique 
status of Indian tribes with respect to conceptions of group rights). My interest in these 
models focuses on the lessons they tell about our ongoing commitment to pluralism and our 
ability (personal and collective) to embrace diversity as a constitutive element of our soci-
ety.   
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a critique of the absolute sovereignty of the state and in a description 
of society as composed of a variety of self-governing groups, coordi-
nated by a centralized government. It reflected Cohen’s socialist poli-
tics, particularly his support for labor unions, and his aspirations as 
a Jewish American to be assimilated in the body politic of the nation. 
In the early 1930s, Cohen believed that socialist pluralism would 
solve not only the conflict between labor and capital, but also many 
other problems involving groups (that is, ethnic, racial, or religious 
tensions). When he joined the Department of the Interior to help 
draft the IRA, Cohen further assumed that Indian reservations were 
fertile fields where his socialist pluralist ideal of self-governing com-
munities could be successfully planted.  
 Drawing on Cohen’s correspondence, legal notes, and memoranda, 
Part III explores Cohen’s articulation of his socialist pluralist ideal, 
his reasons for adopting it, and how Cohen’s socialist pluralist as-
sumptions affected his role in drafting and administering the IRA. 
Particularly, I show how Cohen’s belief in the plausibility of univer-
sal political structures as solutions for diverse problems hindered his 
aspirations to protect the rights of Indian tribes and, more broadly, 
to devise a plural polity. Part III concludes with Cohen’s reevaluation 
of socialist pluralism, especially his growing attentiveness to the im-
portance of cultural interests. 
 The core of Part IV is “systematic pluralism”—Cohen’s second 
model for realizing diverse group interests.28 Systematic pluralism 
was informed by Cohen’s growing alertness to cultural interests, 
which led him to identify not only a multiplicity of group interests 
within one system, but also a multiplicity of value systems. While his 
socialist pluralism expressed a commitment to the mediation of con-
flicting interests within one legal system, Cohen’s systematic plural-
ism sought to reconcile conflicts between diverse value systems by 
expanding any given system to encompass the values and assump-
tions of other systems. It imagined law as capable of incorporating 
the variety of value systems that characterized American society. It 
meant to protect the rights of Native Americans—as well as Jewish 
Americans, particularly Jewish refugees from Europe—to bring their 
different values into the American polity. According to Cohen, the 
fulfillment of his ideal of systematic pluralism required a commit-
ment to group rights. 
 As Part IV shows, the Handbook reflected this intellectual shift. 
Cohen wrote the Handbook in an attempt to improve the                
                                                                                                                    
 28. I label this model “systematic pluralism” to allude to the article in which, as I 
show, Cohen articulated this interpretation of pluralism. See Felix S. Cohen, The Relativity 
of Philosophical Systems and the Method of Systematic Relativism, 36 J. PHIL. 57 (1939) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Systematic Relativism], reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra 
note 6, at 95; see also infra text accompanying notes 216-23. 
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understanding of the relationship between Indians and the federal 
government. Aiming at the inclusion of historically marginalized so-
cial and cultural voices, one of the main themes of the Handbook was 
that a long line of conquerors, including the federal government, had 
recognized tribal rights. Ironically, this recognition also entailed the 
subjection of tribal affairs to congressional control.29 Cohen’s attempt 
to universalize a theory of group rights, in short, tended to obscure 
the voices of particular groups in actively determining their own 
rights. As many have noted, the voices of Indian tribes were missing 
from the Handbook.30  
 As Cohen’s analysis became fixated on the need to protect particu-
lar group rights, his systematic pluralist assumption—that social, 
philosophical, legal, and ethical systems could be enlarged to include 
other systems, ultimately becoming one—gradually disintegrated. 
Part V examines Cohen’s alternative—the third model for accommo-
dating diverse group interests, which I label “comparative plural-
ism.” In the late 1940s, comparative pluralism endorsed the particu-
lar interests of groups (for example, Native Americans and Jewish 
Americans) as valid, and sought to mediate conflicting value systems, 
not by extending one system to include others, but by encouraging 
dialogue between and among distinct systems. It embraced the pres-
ervation of all particular traditions as the American ideal of democ-
racy. 
 As Part V shows, the ICCA reflected this vision. In Cohen’s view, 
the ICCA was meant to settle historical and cultural differences be-
tween Indian tribes and American society. Supposedly accepting that 
tribal sovereignty was inherent rather than delegated, the ICCA 
waived the sovereign immunity of the federal government and al-
lowed Indian tribes to sue the government for damages for their re-
linquished lands. Seeking to recognize the voices of Indian tribes, the 
ICCA established a special investigatory commission to hear and de-
termine tribal land claims against the United States.31 By providing 
a forum (however limited) for Indian tribes to tell their narratives of 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Notably, the Handbook resurrected “the fiction of conquest,” thus preserving the 
plenary power of Congress to intervene in the tribes’ domestic affairs. E.g., RUSSEL 
LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND 
POLITICAL LIBERTY 112 (1980). Barsh and Henderson explain: 
According to the conquest myth, tribes possess, at first, all of the powers of a 
sovereign nation. Conquest by the United States renders the tribe subject to 
federal legislative powers, and effectively terminates the external sovereignty 
of the tribe. Finally, the balance of internal powers is subject to qualification by 
treaties and express legislation. 
Id. at 278; see also Russel Lawrence Barsh, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, 1982 Edition, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799 (1982) (book review). 
 30. E.g., Deloria, supra note 21, at 963. 
 31. Ch. 959, § 1, 60 Stat. 1049, 1049 (1946); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 232. 
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American history, Cohen hoped to encourage communication be-
tween distinct groups, for example, between Indians and non-
Indians. By emphasizing the possibility of translation between hold-
ers of diverse value systems, Cohen—the Jewish American—also 
hoped that the ICCA would prove the superiority of comparative plu-
ralism to what at the time seemed to be the alternative—
totalitarianism. As Part V also shows, during the drafting and im-
plementation of the ICCA, the interests of Indian tribes were often 
lost in this web of political, personal, and intellectual goals.32 
 Finally, Part VI of the Article examines the aftermath of the In-
dian New Deal. Cohen’s legal work during the New Deal both influ-
enced and was motivated by his changing interpretations of plural-
ism. His fascination with pluralism was unique, particularly his at-
tempts to devise legal mechanisms that would be sensitive to compet-
ing social, political, economic, and cultural systems. Also exceptional 
was Cohen’s freedom to bring theories of pluralism to bear upon na-
tional policy. With its orientation toward group rights, pluralism did 
not seem as a natural outgrowth of the ideals of American liberalism. 
During the New Deal, the Department of the Interior welcomed 
Cohen’s experiments. But as the Cold War developed, attacks 
mounted on anything remotely socialist, let alone communist, and 
pressures increased to change federal Indian policy. The 1950s thus 
witnessed a variety of attempts to end the special status of Indian 
tribes and their particular relationship to the federal government. In 
1958, five years after Cohen’s death, a new version of the Handbook 
of Federal Indian Law sought to eradicate the pluralistic characteris-
tics of the original edition.33 In such an atmosphere, the Indian 
Claims Commission failed to provide sufficient compensation for lost 
lands. 
 The Indian New Deal was a short moment in American history, 
but its impact is of enduring importance. Each of its products (the 
IRA, the Handbook, and the ICCA) was informed by a different in-
terpretation of pluralism; each accepted diversity as a constitutive 
element of American society. The IRA attempted to create a general 
structure under which different tribes could exercise their autonomy. 
The Handbook, in turn, sought to expand the American legal system 
                                                                                                                    
 32. Cf. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 29. They note: 
The Indian Claims Act was not passed just to make it possible for tribes to sue 
the United States . . . . It was hoped that the Indian Claims Commission would 
accelerate the process of liquidating claims and thereby remove as quickly as 
possible Indians’ supposed incentive for retaining their tribal allegiances. 
Id. at 125. 
 33. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
(1958) [hereinafter 1958 HANDBOOK]. In 1982, a new edition of the original Handbook was 
published. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et 
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter 1982 HANDBOOK]. Another version is currently in production. 
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to take account of the particular interests of Indian tribes. Finally, 
the ICCA attempted to mediate the tensions between particular legal 
cultures, not by incorporating them under general or universal struc-
tures, but by creating forms of communication that would allow 
translation from one legal system to another. 
 It is important to remember, nonetheless, that the IRA, the 
Handbook, and the ICCA failed to fulfill the goals they were set to 
achieve. Indeed, their significance lies outside federal Indian policy 
during the New Deal.34 As models of pluralism, they offer plausible 
archetypes for addressing issues involving indigenous peoples, eth-
nic, or religious groups. They, furthermore, contain lessons for con-
temporary attempts by demonstrating that the choices of policymak-
ers reflect not only legal or intellectual ideologies, but also the inter-
section of the policymakers’ own sense of identity with their under-
standing of other social and cultural identities. 
 I conclude both with doubt and with hope. The history of plural-
ism counsels doubt as it begins in an abyss of hate, violence, and 
colonization. The failure of the Indian New Deal may indicate the in-
adequacy of law (statutory, judicial, and codified) as a means of over-
coming political, social, economic, or cultural chasms, and hence also 
the shortcomings of any attempt to devise a plural polity through 
law. Cohen naively viewed federal law as a site for remedying collec-
tive traumas, particularly the Indian trauma of colonization (or 
forced inclusion). Underlying this understanding of the law was 
Cohen’s personal relationship to American law as a site for amelio-
rating the Jewish trauma of exile (or forced exclusion). The trauma 
that law inflicted, even as it sought to remedy past injuries to par-
ticular communities, was thus repressed. Similar constraints con-
tinue to impede contemporary attempts to devise a plural polity, as 
different others (ethnic, religious, cultural, and political groups) 
struggle both to escape law’s violence and to come under its protec-
tion.35 
                                                                                                                    
 34. On the importance of Indian law to the main concerns of American legal thought, 
see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993); Frank Pommersheim, 
“Our Federalism” in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the 
Federal Courts’ Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (2000); and 
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989). 
 35. On the relationship between law and trauma, see Shoshana Felman, Forms of 
Judicial Blindness: Traumatic Narratives and Legal Repetitions, in HISTORY, MEMORY AND 
THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999). See also Robert M. Cover, Vio-
lence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE 
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER]. 
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 Yet, in the shadows of the law lurks hope, as law’s constraints 
may be transformed into possibilities. For those who seek to create a 
plural polity, and for those who are affected by such attempts, legal 
structures become sites for social contacts. Cohen’s personal devel-
opment, particularly the influence of interactions with Indian tribes 
on his own sense of identity as a Jewish American, is thus an impor-
tant aspect of the narrative.36 Not only is this transformation mapped 
out in the body of federal Indian law; it also illustrates how even 
failed attempts to devise formalistic legal structures to accomplish 
pluralistic goals create peripheries where pluralism might flourish. 
At the very least, such attempts force individuals to recognize them-
selves and their assumptions about others. In the shadows of the 
law, doubt may turn to hope. 
II.   SETTING 
A.   Pluralism 
 Emerging at the turn of the twentieth century, pluralism, espe-
cially as developed by William James, insisted on the plurality of 
things, as given in experience, and on the impossibility of a single 
law to traverse all the various domains of being.37 A pluralist theory 
of knowledge insisted on the multiplicity (whether limited or infinite) 
of knowers in the world and various forms of knowledge or truth,38 
none of which could claim epistemological primacy.39 In ethics, plu-
ralism implied the existence of a variety of competing ends, among 
which policymakers had to choose. American democracy was accord-
                                                                                                                    
 36. My argument in this essay is limited to Cohen’s personal transformation. The 
transformation of individual Indians (the other other) through such encounters is a topic 
for another article. 
 37. JEAN WAHL, THE PLURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 317-18 
(Fred Rothwell trans., The Open Court Co. 1925). 
 38. This characterization is based on Hilary Putnam’s interpretation of pluralism. 
Putnam traces pluralism to Kant. In the third Critique and in Kant’s postcritical writings, 
according to Putnam, one can see more than “the simple dualism of a scientific image of 
the world and a moral image of the world.” HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN 
QUESTION 30 (1995). There is, Putnam argues, “a tendency towards genuine pluralism, 
which Kant perhaps resisted, but which nevertheless surfaces in his work.” Id. Particu-
larly, according to Putnam, one can see in Kant’s writings “various interactions between 
these two [images] and various spinoffs—spinoffs that come from the interdependence of 
the moral image of the world and the scientific image of the world . . . spinoffs that come 
from the interaction of pure practical reason with sensibility and inclination, and so on.” 
Id. Thus, Putnam argues, Kant began “to speak not only of a moral image of the world and 
a scientific image of the world, but also . . . of a religious image of the world . . . and . . . 
aesthetic images of the world, and also of legal images of the world, and so on.” Id. at 30-
31. However, Putnam continues, in spite of Kant’s “incipient pluralism,” Kant maintained 
that only the scientific image of the world contained what might properly be called “knowl-
edge.” Id.; see also WAHL, supra note 37, at 155 (discussing William James's pluralism). 
 39. See NELSON GOODMAN & CATHERINE Z. ELGIN, RECONCEPTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 
AND OTHER ARTS AND SCIENCES 24-25 (1988).  
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ingly the outcome of constructive change, which resulted in individu-
als ideally considering all interests when making political decisions. 
“Values were ‘objective’ because they were inter-subjectively verifi-
able.”40 
 Pluralism had much in common with pragmatism. Both ap-
proaches substituted empiricism, particularism, indeterminacy, and 
uncertainty for rationalism, universalism, determinacy, and cer-
tainty.41 Pragmatism, especially as espoused by James, emphasized 
that the understanding of reality was mediated through experience. 
It was a theory of truth that sought to redefine reality according to 
experience.42 Pluralism focused on the complex nature of reality. Not 
only was our conception of reality mediated through our individual 
experiences—as pragmatism suggested—but reality was also, for 
each one of us, one and many at the same time.43 Individuals had 
“separate ideas of the chair, of the table, of the pew.”44 They had “an 
idea of them all together. Yet this last idea [was] not made up of the 
former separate ones—it [was] a genuine unit, in which the separate 
ones [were] parts. The separate ones [were] independent of it and 
[were] not independent of it—and so on.”45 
 Pluralism’s focus on the relationship between the one and the 
many appealed to Progressive thinkers. It offered a way out of the 
tension between conservative individualism, on the one hand, and 
radical collectivism, on the other.46 During the early decades of the 
twentieth century, James’s students and followers thus transformed 
his pluralist philosophy—his discussion of forms of knowledge and 
the relationship between the one and the many—into arguments 
about democracy and national identity. Political theorists found in 
                                                                                                                    
 40. BRUCE KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, CAMBRIDGE 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1860-1930, at 510 (1977). This argument draws on an examination of the 
works of Ralph Barton Perry. Though not a self-proclaimed pluralist, Perry, whose 
Thought and Character of William James (1935) is still one of the best commentaries on 
James, was an ally, rejecting idealism in ethics in favor of a more pluralistic theory of val-
ues. See RALPH B. PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE: ITS MEANING AND BASIC 
PRINCIPLES CONSTRUED IN TERMS OF INTEREST (1926); see also KUKLICK, supra, at 255, 
409, 441-42, 505-15. 
 41. For a similar discussion of modernism and postmodernism, see Roderick A. Mac-
donald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 69, 71 (1998). 
 42. E.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF 
THINKING (1907). 
 43. E.g., WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE: HIBBERT LECTURES AT 
MANCHESTER COLLEGE ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PHILOSOPHY (University of Ne-
braska Press, 1996) (1909). 
 44. Horace M. Kallen, A Pluralistic Universe: Professor James on the Present Situa-
tion in Philosophy, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, June 16, 1909, at 26 (book review). 
 45. Id.; see also Hilary Putnam, James’s Theory of Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO WILLIAM JAMES 166 (Ruth Anna Putnam ed., 1997). 
 46. Cf. Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and 
the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 L. & HIST. REV. 59, 60 (1993). 
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James’s philosophy a solution to rapidly changing social and eco-
nomic conditions—in particular, the rise of big corporations, labor 
agitation, and growing disparities of wealth and income. If, as James 
argued, “[t]he pluralistic world [was] . . . more like a federal republic 
than like an empire or a kingdom,”47 then, political pluralists argued, 
sovereignty could not be absolute. Rather, sovereignty was distrib-
uted among different groups, in particular political groups such as 
churches, trade unions, neighborhood groups, but also—often to the 
dismay of many political pluralists who sided with labor in its battle 
against capital—the business corporation.48 Cultural critics, in turn, 
turned to James’s pluralism to attack the ideology of the melting pot, 
that is, the notion that all cultures were destined in the long run to 
become merged into one homogeneous mass, and that it was desir-
able for all cultural groups to divest themselves of traces of their na-
tive cultures. Instead, cultural pluralists stressed the significant con-
tribution of diverse cultural groups—that is, ethnic or racial 
groups—to the western democratic tradition. In their writings, eth-
nic, racial, and class differences became important sources of—not 
obstacles to—individual freedom.49  
 The analysis proposed by cultural and political pluralists antici-
pated issues raised in our contemporary discussions of civil society 
and our debates over the politics of identity, particularly with respect 
to indigenous peoples. Cultural pluralists sought legal mechanisms 
that would accommodate the distinct heritages of diverse cultural 
groups; political pluralists strove to empower distinct associations by 
recognizing their sovereignty, however limited. As a midway between 
radical collectivism, on the one hand, and conservative individual-
ism, on the other, cultural and political pluralists chose the group as 
the forum in which individuals received meanings for their ideas and 
actions.50 Their argument was teleological. Cultural pluralists em-
phasized the particular and group-derived identities of individuals 
and urged the polity to preserve the cultural heritage of every ethnic 
group. Political pluralists advocated a functional concept of political 
representation in order to protect the needs of distinct associations. 
Despite their seemingly distinct focal points—involuntary versus 
                                                                                                                    
 47. JAMES, supra note 43, at 321-22. 
 48. E.g., THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF G.D.H. COLE, 
J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989); MARY P. FOLLETT, THE NEW STATE: 
GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1918); W.Y. ELLIOTT, THE 
PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS: SYNDICALISM, FASCISM, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 
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 49. E.g., Horace M. Kallen, Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot (pts. 1 & 2), NATION, 
Feb. 18, 1915, at 190-94, & Feb. 25, 1915, at 217-20 [hereinafter Kallen, Democracy Versus 
the Melting Pot], reprinted in HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLES 67 (1924) 
[hereinafter KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY]. 
 50. See Ernst, supra note 46, at 60. 
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voluntary associations—cultural and political pluralists alike envi-
sioned groups as repositories of particular ends that policymakers 
needed to recognize. Whether marching under the banner of “cultural 
self-determination” or that of “self-government,” advocates of both 
ideologies pledged a strong commitment to group autonomy. 
 Early theories of cultural and political pluralism laid the founda-
tion for Felix Cohen’s changing understandings of pluralism and, 
more broadly, for the evolution of different interpretations of plural-
ism throughout the twentieth century. For most of the 1910s and 
1920s, such interpretations were limited to criticisms of existing poli-
cies. The coming to power of the New Deal administration, however, 
offered an opportunity for many pluralists to bring their theories to 
bear upon national policy.51 The door of federal Indian law opened 
when in 1933, Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt’s choice for a Secretary of 
the Interior, selected John Collier as the new Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs. To assist Collier, Ickes appointed William Zimmerman, 
an old family friend, as an Assistant Commissioner, and Nathan R. 
Margold as Solicitor of the Department of the Interior. Felix Cohen 
came as an Assistant Solicitor.52 As Part II.B details, what Cohen 
saw in 1933 on Indian reservations was “a condition approximating 
legalized anarchy.”53 
B.   Federal Indian Policy on the Eve of the New Deal54 
 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indian 
tribes were at the outer boundaries of American society. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century, white settlers sought mainly to push Indian 
tribes westward and made no attempt to integrate the tribes into 
Anglo-American society. Unlike other minority groups, Indian tribes 
were regarded as “distinct political communities” with limited sover-
eignty, as Chief Justice Marshall described them in his famous 
                                                                                                                    
 51. See id. (noting the impact of pluralism on labor legislation). 
 52. For more information about these appointments, see T.H. WATKINS, RIGHTEOUS 
PILGRIM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HAROLD L. ICKES, 1874-1952, at 325-33 (1990); and 
KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER’S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954, at 113-17 
(1977). For correspondence between Margold, Collier, Ickes, and Felix Frankfurter, see 
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 53. [Felix S. Cohen], Memorandum: The Problem of Law and Order on Indian Reser-
vations in Relation to the Wheeler-Howard Bill (ca. 1934), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 11, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University [here-
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Harry Edelstein (Aug, 13, 1937), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, supra, which 
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 54. The following is a sketch of federal Indian policy at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. For a more complete account, see RUSCO, supra note 4, at 1-61. 
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Worcester v. Georgia opinion.55 Their efforts to maintain their tribal 
organization, however, often proved futile in the face of military con-
quest, fraudulent or unfulfilled treaties, and the pressure of white 
settlement that forced them away from most of their lands.56 Begin-
ning in the 1850s, Indians were forced onto reservations.57 
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the federal govern-
ment took a more active role in Indian affairs, embracing a policy 
that legalized the devastating disintegration of Indian life. Beginning 
in the 1870s, government officials stressed the need to assimilate all 
Indians into the mainstream of American life. The General Allotment 
Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act),58 which articulated the new policy of as-
similation, targeted the tribes’ communal holding of property.59 
Grounded in classical legal thought and in a particular image of 
masculinity, the Act equated freedom with individual possession of 
property.60 It sought to force assimilation and the disintegration of 
tribal organization, particularly through the distribution of commu-
nal lands to individual owners.61 As Richard Hart has recently noted, 
“the Act was meant to force Indians to cease their tribal ways, to be-
come individual farmers on small plots of lands, and thus to open the 
remainder of U.S. Indian reservations to non-Indian use.”62 The turn 
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INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 170. 
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 61. See TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 1-5. 
 62. E. Richard Hart, Foreword to INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 23, at 6, 8. Vine 
Deloria has explained that railroads sought lands across the continent for their tracks and 
for settlements along their lines to ensure the use of the railroads to ship agricultural pro-
duce to both coasts. DELORIA, supra note 23, at 188. The Dawes Act institutionalized the 
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of the twentieth century thus witnessed the reduction of many tribal 
governments “from unalloyed internal sovereigns to virtual nonenti-
ties.”63 
 A series of laws passed during the first decades of the century 
added insult to injury: they sought to enhance Indian assimilation, 
first by giving individual Indians their “pro rata share” of tribal 
funds and then by giving them “American” citizenship. The 1907 
Lacey Act64 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant to indi-
vidual Indians control of their “pro rata share” of tribal funds.65 The 
1917 “Sells Declaration” sanctioned a variety of measures meant to 
swiftly accomplish the absorption of Indians into the nation.66 The 
1919 Citizenship for World War I Veterans Act67 conferred citizen-
ship on every veteran who so desired.68 The Snyder Act of 192169 ex-
panded the powers of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) “to expend 
congressional appropriations for most reservation activities, includ-
ing health, education, employment, real estate administration, and 
irrigation.”70 Finally, the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act71 declared “all 
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United 
                                                                                                                    
concept of “wardship.” Under section 5 of the Act, the federal government would hold title 
to allotted lands for twenty-five years “in trust for the sole use and benefit” of the allottee. 
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 66. Indian Commissioner Sells, A Declaration of Policy, Extract from the Annual Re-
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 67. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350 (1919); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN 
POLICY, supra note 10, at 215.  
 68. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350; see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, su-
pra note 10, at 215. 
 69. Ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 13) (providing an 
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DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 215-16. 
 70. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 55, at 1258; see also ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208; 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 215-16.  
 71. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1401(b)); see also 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 10, at 218. 
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States . . . to be citizens of the United States.”72 Indians were pre-
sumably welcomed into the polity but only as long as they relin-
quished their “old ways.”73 
 The combination was disastrous. Outlining the failures of the al-
lotment policy, the 1928 Meriam Report74 described “poverty, disease, 
suffering, and discontent” among Indians.75 Between 1887 and 1932 
almost two-thirds of what remained of Indian lands were lost to 
white exploitation.76 Many Indians were theoretically in possession of 
considerable property, including land, but were, in reality, paupers.77 
Few became successful farmers or ranchers, a fact that helped to 
deepen social and political divisions on the reservations.78 The distri-
bution of tribal lands also hastened the disintegration of many tribal 
governments or at least forced them to alter their traditional struc-
tures.79 Finally, assimilation was never really even offered: Indians 
were “given” citizenship but denied the rights of citizens, including 
the right to vote, access to local schools, and the right to serve on ju-
ries.80 
 By the late 1920s, the principal actors in the field of Indian policy 
were critical of the policy of allotment.81 With the coming to power of 
the New Deal administration, federal Indian policy was ripe for 
change. Shortly after his appointment in the spring of 1933, John 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253; see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, su-
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 81. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 62-93. 
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Collier—the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs—denounced land 
allotment as a violation of tribal sovereignty and the vested rights 
that Indians had secured in previous treaties in return for much of 
their lands. Collier pledged instead the moral and legal obligation of 
the government to stop land allotment and to act upon the bilateral 
contractual relationship that it had created before 1871 with Indian 
tribes.82 Such was the agenda that Collier envisioned the drafters of 
the IRA adopting.  
 A variety of reasons, including the fact that Collier was yet to so-
lidify his passion into a comprehensive legal program, delayed the 
enactment of the IRA. Then, in the fall of 1933, a decision was made 
to bring in “experts” “with little previous involvement with Indian af-
fairs to take the lead in preparing the legislative program.”83 Felix 
Cohen was one of the two assistant solicitors appointed by Solicitor 
Margold to the task of bill drafting.84 Upon his appointment, Cohen 
criticized the policy of allotment as creating on Indian reservations “a 
condition approximating legalized anarchy, controlled in practice 
only by the unreviewable disciplinary powers of the Indian Office.”85 
To repair the damage, Cohen suggested that the task of the new ad-
ministration was to stop the pressing of “capitalist individualism” on 
Indian tribes “through the allotment of tribal property to individual 
Indians and through the inculcation of the capitalist psychology,” 
and instead, to protect and encourage “a communal ceremony.”86  
 Cohen saw his role in the Department of the Interior as helping to 
carry out on Indian reservations an experiment in different forms of 
communal life and, more broadly, pluralism. According to Cohen, 
pluralism was compatible with centralized governmental planning. 
The balance between centralized planning and decentralized gov-
ernment was, however, very delicate. As the experiment progressed, 
the balance shifted along with Cohen’s understanding of pluralism. 
Parts III through V explore this transformation through the media-
tion of the IRA, the Handbook, and the ICCA. Part III investigates 
the relationship between the IRA and Cohen’s socialist pluralism. 
Part IV examines Cohen’s systematic pluralism and how it affected 
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his writing of the Handbook. Finally, Part V focuses on Cohen’s com-
parative pluralism and how it was reflected in the ICCA.  
III.   “MAKING ‘REDS’ OF THE INDIANS”: SOCIALIST PLURALISM AND 
THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934 
A.   Critique and Utopia 
 Cohen’s critique of the situation on Indian reservations on the eve 
of the New Deal, and, more broadly, his opposition to the policies of 
assimilation and allotment, stemmed from his objection to the impo-
sition of “capitalist individualism” on Indian reservations. In his 
view, the oppression of Indian tribes was far more pervasive than 
suggested by critiques of particular programs and policies: Cohen be-
lieved that with respect to Indian tribes, capitalism itself was op-
pressive. To leave Indian tribes to compete with business corpora-
tions in a supposedly noncoercive world, he asserted, was as encum-
bering as the control of their affairs by the BIA. “We shall not add to 
the Indian’s freedom by accepting the shallow arguments of those 
who insist that the Indian will be free when he is given his own indi-
vidual property, [and] permitted to live under state laws and enjoy 
freedom of contract,” Cohen proclaimed.87 “The termination of gov-
ernmental control,” he concluded, “would not inaugurate Indian free-
dom. It would only exchange the slavery of bureaucracy for the slav-
ery of poverty.”88 
 What, then, was a solution that served Indian interests? Accord-
ing to Cohen, in order to protect the economic and political interests 
of Indian tribes, the IRA had to establish self-governing socialist 
communities on Indian reservations. Ironically, the corporation—the 
symbol of capitalism—was his model.89 Quoting from the conclusions 
of the 1928 Meriam Report90 “that control from outside the social 
group secures only negative results,”91 Cohen suggested that 
“through the mechanism of municipal and quasi-municipal charters 
issued by the Secretary of the Interior to Indian tribes and ratified by 
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 88. Id.; see also Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations, supra note 53. 
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208  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:189 
 
the Indians concerned,” Indian tribes would establish their self-
government.92 
 Cohen believed that the “incorporation” of Indian tribes would 
prevent future loss of Indian lands and allow the repurchase of res-
ervation lands already lost to non-Indians. He further maintained 
that the government should provide Indians with the credit facilities 
they needed to develop their own properties and should encourage 
communal holding of lands and other resources that could not be effi-
ciently used by individuals.93 Ultimately, the various political and 
economic powers, which were in 1934 invested in the Department of 
the Interior, were to be transferred to their true “owners”—the Indi-
ans.94 Through the establishment of “definite community ordinances” 
and community courts, as well as a special Federal Court of Indian 
Affairs, Cohen also expected an important shift toward legal stability 
and political advancement.95 When all that was secured, he pre-
dicted, the powers of the BIA to govern tribal affairs could be entirely 
abolished.96 Genuine socialist communities would then flourish on 
Indian reservations.97 
 As Part III.B demonstrates, Cohen’s critique of federal Indian pol-
icy and his understanding of the tasks of the Indian New Deal were 
informed by socialist pluralism. In his opinion, Indian tribes were a 
test case for the feasibility of his socialist pluralist program. Cohen 
hoped that the establishment of socialist communities on Indian res-
ervations would be a first step toward the formation of similar com-
munities across the nation. As Part III.B shows, in the 1930s, social-
ist pluralism reflected both Cohen’s political aspirations and his 
sense of identity as a Jewish American. 
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. 
 93. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 77. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations, supra note 53; see also 
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 97. Letter from Felix Cohen to Joseph Lash (May 27, 1934), Joseph P. Lash Papers, 
Box 51, Folder 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
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B.   Dreams and Subtexts 
 The eldest of the three children of Mary Ryshpan and Morris 
Raphael Cohen, the renowned Jewish philosopher of City College of 
New York, Felix Cohen graduated from CCNY in 1926 and pursued 
graduate studies both in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard 
University (Ph.D., 1929) and at Columbia Law School (LL.B., 1931). 
Immediately after graduating from law school, Cohen spent a year as 
a clerk for Justice Bernard Sheintag of the Supreme Court of New 
York. He then joined the law firm of Hays, Podell and Shulman in 
New York, a plaintiff’s firm that specialized in minority stockholders’ 
claims. In 1933, Nathan Margold, the newly appointed Solicitor of 
the Department of the Interior and a friend of the Cohen family, 
asked Felix to give up a year of private practice and join him in the 
Department of the Interior. Cohen accepted the offer and came in as 
an Assistant Solicitor. The planned year stretched to fourteen. In 
1943, Cohen was promoted to the position of Associate Solicitor. 
Upon his resignation from government service in 1947, Cohen re-
ceived the Distinguished Service Award. Six short years later he died 
at the age of forty-six.98 
 According to his widow, Lucy M. Kramer, Felix Cohen was “at-
tracted to Indian law because he had a great feel for the land and the 
return to the simple life. The Indian way, as he read it as a child, had 
a tremendous attraction for him.”99 Indeed, like many middle-class 
men of his generation who shared a nostalgic love for nature and the 
natural,100 Cohen held a stereotypical, sentimental view of the “In-
dian.” Informed by it, Cohen believed that Indian reservations held a 
promise for a better national future, a future premised on group self-
government, centralized planning at the federal level, and protection 
for individual rights. As this Part shows, this combination of social-
ism and pluralism underlay Cohen’s socialist pluralist ideal. 
 As a relative noted after his death, Cohen was “a doctrinaire so-
cialist”; no one “could reason him out of it. He knew what was 
right.”101 Cohen’s Ph.D. dissertation advocated hedonism as the ethi-
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cal system befitting the political agenda of socialism.102 At Columbia 
Law School, he embraced the legal realist emphasis on the social and 
political character of law.103 If, as legal realists argued, law reflected 
politics, and particularly the hegemony of class, then, Cohen sug-
gested, progressive reform required the substitution of radical for 
conservative politics—that is, socialism for capitalism.104 In the early 
1930s, he published a series of essays in support of socialism.105 
Shortly after joining the Department of the Interior, he wrote a letter 
to “Comrade” Norman Thomas—“a statement of the position that one 
Socialist finds himself in within the framework of a capitalist gov-
ernment.” “I feel that I owe you, whose judgment in these matters I 
most respect,” Cohen concluded his letter, “a statement of my reasons 
for thinking that I can serve the Socialist movement, for a while at 
least, in my present status.”106 
 Cohen’s reasons were simple. He believed that in the Department 
of the Interior, with colleagues who expressed “a pretty steadfast de-
sire to protect challenged Indian rights against various forms of capi-
talist exploitation,”107 he could bring to fruition his program for re-
form. “One expects enthusiasm in the [National Recovery Admini-
stration] crowd, who expect they’re ushering in the millennium with 
golden trumpets,” Cohen wrote to Joseph Lash, “but to find it in a 
staid and stable department like the Interior is a shock.” “Even the 
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2001]  AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 211 
 
lawyers around the place,” he added in self-reflection, “who might be 
expected to inject a shot of cynicism and reaction, are amusedly or 
sympathetically tolerant.”108 
 Cohen’s program for reform was informed by earlier theories of 
political pluralism, particularly Harold Laski’s,109 and by the legal 
realists’ view of law as an apology for political (social and economic) 
oppression.110 Troubled by the rise of big corporations and the grow-
ing agitation of labor, Cohen’s early works analogized what he 
viewed as the sovereign status of the corporation to the status of la-
bor unions. He urged the distribution of sovereignty to all associa-
tions, including labor unions, “trade unions, industrial unions, con-
sumer organizations, farm organizations, semigovernmental corpora-
tions, and forms of associations that have not yet been invented.”111 
Sovereignty was conditioned, however, upon a group’s willingness to 
be democratically governed and, if possible, to adopt an economic 
structure premised on communal holding of property. Cohen’s early 
works, in short, envisioned self-governing communities such as labor 
unions as the foundation of American democracy.112  
 Pluralists described a variety of principles according to which col-
lective entities participated in the body politic of the nation. Many 
left the state devoid of any superior moral character or obliging force. 
The state was a “society of societies,” and individual allegiance to it 
was conditioned upon other—more immediate—allegiances to asso-
ciations, the latter being the primary source of action and identifica-
tion.113 In 1937, Louis Jaffe summarized this view, arguing that if 
groups were sovereign, they were also lawmaking entities and the 
state lost its absolute power as an exclusive producer of a singular 
system of national law.114 
 Cohen rejected such conclusions. As a socialist, he feared that 
without centralized planning, free competition between corporations 
and labor unions would benefit the former at the expense of the lat-
ter. He further predicted that the idea of a free market of groups 
would substitute the sovereignty of one group—the corporation—for 
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the sovereignty of the state.115 Instead of reducing sovereignty to its 
parts, Cohen’s approach was premised on a strong commitment to 
governmental (socialist) planning. He believed that national plan-
ning was required not only to coordinate the plans of different self-
governing associations, to balance production and consumption, and 
to distribute wealth and income, but also to protect fundamental in-
dividual rights.116 
 When he joined the New Deal, Cohen viewed Indian reservations 
as fertile fields for the cultivation of his socialist pluralism. The tra-
ditional tribal holding of land suggested to him that the Indian way 
of life was more akin to socialism than was the prevailing American 
way of life. Cohen’s critique of assimilation did not stem from con-
cerns about the effects of assimilation on tribal culture. Rather, he 
was troubled by the disintegration of the economic structure of In-
dian tribes and the inculcation of capitalist individualism on Indian 
reservations. In Cohen’s opinion, in short, assimilation was an eco-
nomic rather than a cultural phenomenon. He viewed Indian tribes 
as political groups, not ethnic or cultural ones; indeed, they were po-
litical groups whose economic structure (particularly their structure 
of property ownership) he hoped to appropriate for other political 
groups and for society in general. Accordingly, for a while after 
Cohen had joined the Department of the Interior to help draft the 
IRA, he used to comment that they were “making ‘Reds’ of the Indi-
ans.”117  
 In 1948, upon his resignation from government service, Cohen 
would testify to the biased origins of his initial approach to Indian af-
fairs, admitting that he had no practical experience with Indian is-
sues before he was appointed.118 Though an admirer of the wilderness 
who, like young men of his generation, loved hiking and canoeing, he 
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was a New Yorker, “from a city where there were no reclamation, 
public land, Indian or territorial problems,—problems of which [he] 
had never heard until [he] came to Washington.”119 I am “only a law-
yer,” he wrote to anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser two years 
after his appointment.120 Read carefully, such comments reveal more 
than sheer unfamiliarity. 
 New York City certainly experienced its share of racial tensions. 
Yet, like many middle-class Progressives who came of age amidst 
heightening social conflict, Cohen was preoccupied with the struggle 
of labor against capital and believed that cultural and ethnic ten-
sions would be resolved once disparities of wealth and income disap-
peared. His early writings dealt almost exclusively with economic is-
sues. He easily saw that law was a tool of capitalism, but he failed to 
recognize its contribution to racial and cultural hegemony. The atti-
tude of the Socialist Party, whose ranks he joined, toward race rela-
tions was indeed “hazy.”121 In 1936, Cohen and his friends composed 
a Proposed Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Amer-
ica.122 Its third article promised that “the right to share in the work 
of society and to enjoy the product thereof shall not be denied or cur-
tailed because of race, color, sex, religion or political or social be-
liefs.”123 Such fundamental individual rights were subjected, nonethe-
less, to an overarching socialist pluralist structure.124 
 What was the appeal of socialist pluralism? Clearly, Cohen found 
it intellectually and politically appropriate, but there was a stronger 
attraction. The combination of socialism and pluralism was a central 
aspect of Cohen’s own sense of identity as a Jewish American and, 
more important, as an heir to a secular, post-Enlightenment tradi-
tion of Judaism. Cohen’s paternal grandparents, Abraham Mordecai 
and Bessie Farfel Cohen, immigrated to America from Minsk, Russia 
in 1892. Like many first-generation immigrants, they remained Or-
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thodox, if not in faith at least in ritual. Many second-generation im-
migrants, like Felix Cohen’s father, Morris Cohen, in turn, believed 
that religious Orthodoxy—which for centuries had required its ad-
herents to separate themselves from the nations of the world—
prevented them from gaining their freedom, and they zealously re-
jected it.125 Instead of embracing the patriarchal formalism of Ortho-
doxy, second- and third-generation immigrants turned to the pro-
phetic tradition, whose cry against injustice and search for eternal 
truth appealed to Jews and Christians alike.126 This prophetic tradi-
tion had a strong affinity with the message of socialism—a socialism 
that rejected Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and celebrated solidarity 
and the improvement of economic conditions, on the other hand.127 
For young Jewish men and women who were second- and third-
generation Americans, socialism thus provided a sense of inclusion, 
of belonging with others in a struggle against injustice.  
 Pluralism offered a similar haven. Like other immigrants, Jewish 
Americans were torn between their desire to maintain a particular 
identity—to be ones—and their eagerness to become Americans—
part of the many. Given the resemblance of Jewish and American 
cultural symbols, Jewish immigrants often experienced this tension 
more strongly; they had come to America in search of the “promised-
land,” seeking to leave behind a history of segregation and discrimi-
nation. The possibilities that Americans saw in the frontier were em-
bedded for Jewish immigrants and their children in the eastern 
shores of America. “I am . . . grateful,” Felix Cohen stated more than 
five decades after his father had come to the United States, “grateful 
for the opportunity to serve the country that welcomed my father and 
my grandparents out of slavery into freedom.”128 
 Having arrived in America at different historical moments and 
from various backgrounds, Jewish Americans attributed a variety of 
meanings to the confluence of Jewish and American dreams.129 Some 
called for assimilation. Others, like Horace Kallen, advocated cul-
tural pluralism, arguing that America was to remain a nation com-
posed of many cultural or ethnic nations.130 Between these two ends 
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were cosmopolitans, who viewed particular cultures, the Jewish cul-
ture being one example, as repositories for insights that when 
brought together would allow the development of a more comprehen-
sive conception of national identity. Cosmopolitans did not suggest 
that cultural differences should be eradicated. They objected, how-
ever, to the preservation of such differences in a parochial form, as 
cultural pluralism could imply. Instead, they offered a more fluid un-
derstanding of cultural interaction and influence.131  
 Felix Cohen grew up in a household committed to cosmopolitan-
ism. His father, Morris Cohen, espoused the universal ideals of the 
Enlightenment and mediated the tensions between separatism and 
assimilation by reconstructing the problems of minority groups as 
universal rather than particular. There were accordingly “many hu-
man problems, of which Jews, as human beings, [had] perhaps more 
than their share. But these problems, traced to their ultimate roots 
in reality, [were] also the problems of other minority groups, and 
[every] group of human beings [was] . . . a minority in one situation 
or another . . . .”132 For Morris, a democracy committed to social and 
economic equality was the universal solution to these problems. 
 Although intellectually (or philosophically) a pluralist,133 Morris 
Cohen rejected all social forms of pluralism, warning against the pos-
sible oppressiveness of groups toward their members and toward so-
ciety at large—oppressiveness that could potentially follow from ei-
ther political or cultural pluralism. “We can draw more than one true 
picture of the social world, provided we do not claim that our picture 
is the true one,” he wrote in a critique of Laski’s political pluralism.134 
Jews, he similarly argued in a critique of Kallen’s cultural pluralism, 
adopted the “very popular racial philosophy of history”—that is, “the 
constant tendency to emphasize the consciousness of race”—but 
“[i]nstead of the Teuton, it is the Jew that is the pure or superior 
race.”135 
 Felix Cohen was intrigued by cultural and political pluralism. To 
advocate any form of pluralism, however, would have been perceived 
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as a rebellion against Morris’s intellectual authority. To adopt cul-
tural pluralism would have, in addition, challenged Felix’s own sense 
of identity as a Jewish American. Devoted to his father, intellectually 
and personally, he could thus go only as far as adopting socialist plu-
ralism, an approach that bridged Harold Laski’s political pluralism 
(by describing groups as sovereigns) and Morris Cohen’s critique of it 
(by endorsing centralized planning). While Felix Cohen never dis-
avowed his commitment to centralized planning, his experiences in 
the Department of the Interior altered his vision. Ultimately, he ac-
cepted that all groups, including ethnic and religious groups, had the 
right to self-determination. Such an attitude, however, depended 
upon Cohen’s ability to celebrate his particular ethnic identity. In 
1934, he was yet to recognize his Jewish identity as particular. With-
out this realization, it was safer to view Indian tribes as political—
rather than racial or ethnic—groups.136 Such was Cohen’s assump-
tion when he joined the Department of the Interior to help draft the 
IRA; hence his comment that they were “making ‘Reds’ of the Indi-
ans.”137 
 The goal of the IRA, as New Dealers described it, was to stop al-
lotment and assimilation by delegating to Indian tribes more author-
ity over their economic, social, and political affairs. Cohen’s advocacy 
of Indian self-government within prescribed limits and with the help 
of governmental authorities was radical in its proposed protection of 
Indian interests. Furthermore, Cohen maintained that the provisions 
of the IRA should not be imposed on Indian tribes; he believed that 
the charters should be tailored to the needs of each Indian commu-
nity, and he was the first in the Department to suggest that Indians 
should be consulted during the legislative processes.138 His proposed 
                                                                                                                    
 136. On the character of Indian tribes as ethnic or political groups, see generally Alli-
son M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sov-
ereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993); and Patrick 
Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1311 (1993). For an analysis of the unique status of Indians in American constitu-
tional history, see David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians 
as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
 138. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 211. Indeed, Cohen noted that “[t]he feeling of the Indians 
towards white man’s law [was] often very much like the attitude we should [have taken] if 
[our] country were to come under the domination of some foreign nation of alien race, and 
our conduct subjected to the laws and regulations of a far-off sovereign and to a strange ju-
dicial procedure.” Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations, supra note 53; 
see also Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 77. Cohen wrote: 
The problem of securing a measure of freedom for the Indians of this country 
calls for more than the abolition of obsolete laws, it calls for more than the abo-
lition of undemocratic methods of government. It calls for the active, construc-
tive, cooperation of the Government with the Indians in building a form of or-
ganization through which the Individual Indian can protect and conserve his 
rights. Without such organization the Indian can enjoy freedom only as the fa-
vor of a benevolent administration.  
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community courts were indeed meant to allow tribes to create their 
own laws.139 Cohen’s socialist beliefs, however, limited the scope of 
such pluralistic assumptions.  
 Cohen did not merely wish to make “‘Reds’ of the Indians”; he be-
lieved that Indians were socialists. “The Indian,” he wrote—
disclosing his biased position—was “too deficient in the white man’s 
business equipment, the white man’s love of work, and the white 
man’s selfishness to maintain his economic independence when he is 
turned loose, as an individual, to face the mighty forces of the mod-
ern economic world.”140 Accordingly, the task of the IRA was to ac-
knowledge the socialist temperament of the Indians and to correct 
the damage caused by earlier attempts to eradicate it. Cohen’s pro-
posals outlined ways to persuade, even force, Indians who wished to 
remain owners of individual property to turn over to their communi-
ties the lands they owned.141 Cohen also believed that unequal distri-
bution of rights to land had to be eliminated “if every member of the 
community [was] to be granted some opportunity to wrest a liveli-
hood from the limited resources of the community.”142 After all, as 
self-governing socialist communities, Indian tribes were to provide a 
model that other groups could adopt. “Here in the center of the La-
guana project,” Cohen reported from Mexico, “one sees a true social 
revolution carried out without cruelty or intolerance, and damned ef-
ficiently.”143 
 Cohen genuinely advocated Indian self-government. Knowing lit-
tle about Indian cultures and customs, he interpreted the interests of 
the Indians through his frames of reference. For one thing, when 
Cohen joined the Department of the Interior, he believed that the 
policy of allotment had destroyed tribal governments, turning Indian 
reservations in the eyes of the law (without an authority to enforce 
laws) into “almost a no-man’s land.”144 The establishment of modern 
                                                                                                                    
Id. Cohen recruited his wife Lucy M. Kramer as an unpaid volunteer to “keep track of how 
various Indian tribes were reacting to the specific tentative provisions of the Wheeler-
Howard bill.” Kramer-Cohen et al., supra note 99, at 71.  
 139. See generally RUSCO, supra note 4, at 197-201.  
 140. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 77. 
 141. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 197-98.  
 142. Id. at 198. While Cohen realized that stating such an objective was politically in-
advisable, he also thought it was legally unnecessary, since Indian communities would 
have to arrive at such a policy by “reasoning and bargaining, no matter what the statute 
provides.” Id. 
 143. Postcard from Felix Cohen to Joseph Lash (August 5, 1934) Joseph P. Lash Pa-
pers, Box 51, Folder 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Interestingly, Cohen was so confi-
dent that the rest of the nation would follow the model set on Indian reservations that he 
neglected to note the problems that might be associated with the creation of socialist com-
munities in the midst of a society committed to the values of capitalism. 
 144. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 77; see also Memorandum: Law and Or-
der on Indian Reservations, supra note 53. As Cohen explained, according to the holding in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)—the case that recognized Indian tribes as sepa-
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governments, modeled after municipal and housing corporations145 
and subject to the supervision of the Department, was thus the only 
alternative to assimilation. Furthermore, while Cohen recognized the 
importance of receiving information from the reservations with re-
spect to the IRA, he maintained that consulting the Indians was vital 
“to awaken sympathetic understanding among those most directly 
concerned with this policy.”146 Critical of earlier attempts to impose 
capitalist individualism on Indian reservations,147 Cohen initially 
failed to recognize that the structure he preferred was a cultural 
product, too, and not necessarily suitable for the customs and tradi-
tions of Indian tribes. Ironically, Cohen, who as an intellectual cele-
brated pluralism and as a Jewish American rejected assimilation, 
hoped to create a single economic, if not also political, structure on 
Indian reservations. 
 His colleagues were similarly at fault. Whether or not they drew 
on theories of pluralism, New Dealers sought to protect the auton-
omy of Indian tribes without segregating them from the mainstream 
of American life, however broadly defined. Their solution was thus a 
problematic mixture: they relied on American structures of govern-
ment to protect Indian ways of life and assumed that uniform politi-
cal and economic structures—self-government and communal hold-
ing of lands—would promote the interests of the Indians. Neither the 
                                                                                                                    
rate nations—the states had no constitutional power to regulate the conduct of tribal Indi-
ans or the conduct of their own citizens toward such Indians where the acts in question oc-
curred in Indian country, that is, restricted individual lands as well as unallotted tribal 
lands. Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations, supra note 53. While some 
historians have recently argued that the policy of allotment did not destroy tribal govern-
ments on a wholesale basis, New Dealers in general seem to have believed that the policy 
of allotment had hastened the disintegration of tribal governments and left no machinery 
of justice on the reservations. Cf. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 56-61. Though several criminal 
laws applied to these territories, Cohen suggested that they were, at most, sporadic and ir-
regular. An Indian reservation, Cohen noted, was still in 1933 “as it had been a century 
earlier, a happy hunting ground for criminals, provided only [that] they refrained from se-
ditious activities.” Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 77. Furthermore, as Cohen ex-
plained, neither Indians nor non-Indians were entitled to the ordinary constitutional civil 
liberties while on Indian reservations. Federal laws authorized the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs to summarily remove from any reservation, “with such force as might be nec-
essary,” any person whose presence within the limits of an Indian reservation the Commis-
sioner viewed as “detrimental to the peace and welfare of the Indians.” Id.; see also Memo-
randum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations, supra note 53.  
 145. See Bibliography for use in drafting Tribal Constitutions, Felix S. Cohen Papers, 
Box 6, Folder 77, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale Univer-
sity. 
 146. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 211 (quoting Cohen in a memorandum to Collier). 
 147. For Cohen’s view of attempts to impose policies on Indian reservations, see, for 
example, Draft of Letter from Felix Cohen to Thomas Dignan, Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 
7, Folder 95, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University. 
(“The matter of working out a charter of self-government is something which the Indians 
must do themselves, if the bill is passed, with the aid of private attorneys in whom they 
have confidence, and of officials of the Interior Department.”). 
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liberals nor the socialists among the New Dealers fully realized the 
situated nature of their frames of reference.148 Some of the gaps that 
were left in the IRA due to such misconceptions are examined in Part 
III.C after a brief description of the Act. 
 Daily encounters with Indian tribes during the first months of the 
New Deal taught Cohen the importance and diversity of tribal inter-
ests. As Part III.D shows, this led him to reassess his socialist plural-
ist ideal. With reevaluation came the realization that diverse inter-
ests were not contained within one value system but rather spread 
over a variety of value systems—hence also the inappropriateness of 
universal solutions that focused on the mediation of conflicts within 
one value system. Such an understanding laid the foundation for 
Cohen’s systematic pluralism, which emphasized the need to expand 
the American legal system, not merely to accommodate different in-
terests within one system, but also to encompass the value systems 
or ideals in which such interests were grounded. Part IV will expli-
cate Cohen’s systematic pluralism and its relationship to the Hand-
book.  
C.   Realism and Transformation 
 The initial draft of the IRA was introduced in mid-February 1934 
by Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and Representative Edgar 
Howard of Nebraska, chairmen, respectively, of the Senate and 
House Committees on Indian Affairs. It was a long and complex bill; 
it covered forty-eight pages, and was divided into four titles: Indian 
self-government, education for Indians, lands, and the court of In-
dian affairs.149  
                                                                                                                    
 148. Cf. James P. Boggs, NEPA in the Domain of Federal Indian Policy: Social Knowl-
edge and the Negotiation of Meaning, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 31 (1991). Boggs notes: 
[M]ost scholars regard the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 as inaugu-
rating a distinctly new policy—promoting the reconstitution of tribal govern-
ments—in reaction to the excesses of the allotment period. One may argue, 
however, that the IRA merely signaled a shift from the individualist mode of 
assimilation that drove allotment to a corporatist mode that accorded with the 
emergence of the corporation in everyday life. The IRA undoubtedly was a reac-
tion to the devastation of allotment. Nevertheless, it reflected assimilation in a 
different guise rather than a new-found respect for Native American culture. 
Id. at 59. 
 149. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 19-21. The first title, Indian Self Government, declared 
the right of tribal societies to control their lives by establishing their own governments. It 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant “powers of local self-government and the 
right of incorporation for economic purposes upon petition of one-fourth of the adult Indi-
ans residing on a reservation and ratification of the charter by three-fifths of the resi-
dents.” Id. at 20. Such local governments could then establish and enforce ordinances, 
“contract with the federal government for public services,” regulate membership, and “take 
over other administrative functions deemed suitable by the secretary of the interior.” Id. 
The title left room for the institution of tribal constitutions, which would be the task of the 
Department in the following years. In general, the first title aimed at transforming infor-
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 The draft expressed the general view that Congress should aban-
don the breaking down of tribal organization and the assimilation of 
individual Indians as the objectives of its Indian policy and should 
instead encourage tribal self-government.150 New Dealers disagreed, 
however, on the structure of government that Indian tribes should 
adopt. Some believed that the Indians would choose modern (Ameri-
can-style) constitutions; others hoped that they would follow their 
tribal traditions.151 The draft was thus rather enabling when discuss-
ing the tribes’ internal powers. However, all seemed to agree on an 
economic structure premised on communal holding of lands. The 
draft was thus constraining with respect to the tribes’ economic pow-
ers. Land classification, purchase of lands, transfer of titles, leasing 
of lands—in other words, the external scheme within which self-
government (or, for Cohen, socialist pluralism) was allowed—were to 
be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.152 Overall, New Dealers 
wanted to maintain some form of control (or guardianship) over 
tribal governments so that they could ensure the careful reconstruc-
tion of destroyed self-governance capacities.153  
                                                                                                                    
mal Indian processes into formal—and western—institutions, which the federal govern-
ment would—and could—respect. The second title, Special Education for Indians, an-
nounced that educational policy would emphasize the value of Indian culture. Government 
schools would aim to bring to Indian communities a sense of their own past and values. 
The title thus created a fund for formal education of Indians and different measures to “re-
store traditional Indian cultures.” Id. at 21. The title also provided for training for Indians 
“to take over service positions in the bureau.” Id. The third and most controversial title 
prohibited future land allotments and restored to tribal ownership those lands which had 
been declared surplus under the respective allotment acts but never settled. All lands al-
lotted under the Dawes Act were to be classified into productive units. “Those allotments 
could then be exchanged for shares in the tribal corporation, while heirship lands would be 
ceded to the community and the individual heirs compensated for improvements.” Id. at 
20. The Department of the Interior was also empowered to purchase lands for the tribes. It 
could spend up to $2 million annually for land purchases for existing reservations and for 
the creation of new colonies for landless Indians. Id. at 20-21. The fourth title called for the 
establishment of a Court of Indian Affairs that would consist of seven justices “appointed 
by the president with the consent of the Senate.” PHILP, supra note 52, at 143. The Court 
was to have authority over all legal controversies affecting Indian tribes. Id. It was to “pro-
tect the Indian community . . . against unnecessary obstruction and delay in carrying out 
of the program contemplated in this bill . . . [and afford] effective protection of the rights of 
individuals in the administration of the program.” TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 21.  
 150. E.g., Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Con-
struction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 363-64 
(1997). 
 151. Cohen seems to have initially preferred modern constitutions. See supra Parts 
III.A-B. Commissioner Collier, on the other hand, favored traditional ones. For Collier’s 
position, see Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Traditions and 
the United States Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1578 (1998). See also DELORIA, 
supra note 23, at 187-206. 
 152. See TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 19-21, 30. 
 153. See generally Outline of Bill on Indian Self-Government (ca. 1934), Felix S. Cohen 
Papers, Box 9, Folder 120, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale 
University. For Collier’s vision, see Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 55, at 1258-59. 
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 Commissioner Collier assumed that Congress would quickly ap-
prove the bill, if only because it was endorsed by the Roosevelt ad-
ministration. To his dismay, the passage was not smooth. In addition 
to their objection to the complexity and length of the initial draft, 
most members of the House and Senate Committees favored assimi-
lation. Another factor affecting their response was apparent Indian 
opposition. New Dealers were thus forced to appeal to the Indians. In 
an unprecedented move, they summoned Indian congresses around 
the country where they explained the bill and listened to sugges-
tions.154 A second draft followed, leaving intact the major elements of 
the original draft, but including thirty amendments initiated at these 
congresses.155 Among other things, these amendments abandoned the 
forced transfer of allotted lands from living individuals to tribal con-
trol and modified the provision for transferring such lands to the 
tribe upon the death of the allottee. They further prohibited “the dis-
position of any community or tribal assets without the consent of the 
tribe or community,” and specifically included water rights under the 
protection of the Act.156 Finally, the Indians insisted on including a 
provision that would prevent “the possibility of having 50 active vot-
ers out of a thousand eligible adults bind the entire tribe.”157 
 The second bill did not fare better than the initial draft, forcing 
Collier to accept a new and drastically abbreviated bill, which would 
become the IRA. It included most of the original ideas with respect to 
the termination of allotment, tribal incorporation and organization, 
and employment of Indians by the BIA.158 To help tribes with the 
drafting of constitutions, bylaws, and charters of incorporation for 
business purposes, an annual appropriation of $250,000 was author-
ized. A $10 million revolving credit fund was further created to sup-
port economic development on reservations. In addition, the Indian 
Civilian Conservation Corps helped to bring Indians under many of 
the New Deal relief programs; two policy statements guaranteed In-
dian religious freedom; states where Indians had enrolled in public 
schools were given federal funds; and an Indian Arts and Crafts 
Board was established.159  
 On the other hand, the ability of the tribes and the Department of 
the Interior to acquire allotted lands in order to consolidate was no-
tably diluted. Tribes were also denied the power to take over heirship 
                                                                                                                    
 154. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 245-49; see also PHILP, supra note 52, at 145-54. 
 155. RUSCO, supra note 4, at 248. 
 156. Id. at 248 (quoting the House Committee, Readjustment of Indian Affairs (1934)). 
 157. Id. at 249 (quoting the House Committee, Readjustment of Indian Affairs (1934)). 
See generally id. at 220-49. 
 158. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 27-28. 
 159. Id.; see also Philp, supra note 82, at 17-18; DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN 
POLICY, supra note 10, at 229-30. 
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lands. Later, Collier would claim that losing those features was “a 
major disaster to the Indians, the Indian Service, and the pro-
gram.”160 Furthermore, the final form of the IRA called for a referen-
dum to be held on reservations included under the Act within one 
year (subsequently extended to two years) to determine whether or 
not the tribe chose to come under the provisions of the Act. Tribes 
that rejected the IRA would remain under the BIA’s direct control. 
Tribes that accepted it could then prepare a constitution, to be rati-
fied by “a majority of the Indians on a given reservation and officially 
recognized members of the tribe.”161 The establishment of a tribal 
council and a charter of incorporation would follow. The time limit of 
the referenda requirement put an undue burden both on the Indians 
and on the Department, and produced mistakes that might have oth-
erwise been avoided.162 
 New Dealers rushed to administer reorganization. According to 
one report, during the first year of the IRA “172 [Indian groups] with 
a total population of 132,000 accepted reorganization and 73 with a 
total population of 63,000 rejected it.”163 The most significant rejec-
tion occurred on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona and New Mex-
ico.164 After the initial referenda were administered to meet the two-
year deadline, New Dealers started drafting constitutions for the dif-
ferent tribes.165 Cohen was the leading architect of these constitu-
tions. A model constitution was prepared and teams were sent to the 
reservations to discuss general and particular provisions with the 
Indians.166 Some tribes chose to follow their own traditions; others 
                                                                                                                    
 160. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 28 (quoting JOHN COLLIER, THE INDIANS OF THE 
AMERICAS 265 (1947)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 27-28; see also PHILP, supra note 52, at 158-60. 
 163. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 32. Numbers vary in different reports, yet the pattern 
seems accurate. But see Russel Lawrence Barsh, Another Look at Reorganization: When 
Will Tribes Have a Choice?, INDIAN TRUTH, Oct. 1982, at 4. 
 164. While the BIA attributed the defeat to campaigns carried on by special interest 
groups, the vote probably reflected the bitter controversy between the BIA and the Navajos 
over stock reduction, a controversy that coincided with the referendum. TAYLOR, supra 
note 56, at 33.  
 165. The basic administrative framework was complete by the end of 1936. Indian 
groups were enrolled in the program, formal procedures for tribal organization were devel-
oped, and units were created within the Department to oversee the process and to coordi-
nate the various political and economic programs for the Indians. The Indian Organization 
Division was such a unit. It supervised the preparation of constitutions and reviewed the 
operations of the new established councils. In addition to lawyers, Collier brought in an-
thropologists from the Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of American Ethnology and from 
universities. In 1936, “an Applied Anthropology Staff was established within the bureau 
under H. Scudder Mekeel, formerly of Harvard University.” Id. at 36-38. 
 166. In his recent analysis of the legislative process of the IRA, Elmer Rusco noted that 
“nothing in the IRA was designed to impose any particular structure of government on an 
Indian society.” RUSCO, supra note 4, at 296. While the IRA on its face did not adopt one 
structure, as this Article suggests, individual policymakers held certain sets of beliefs that 
determined their vision for the IRA and how they went about administering it. For model 
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were willing to substitute a modern constitution for their Indian an-
tecedents. As Graham Taylor has concluded, “[b]y the middle of 1937, 
sixty-five tribes had established constitutions and thirty-two had also 
ratified corporate charters. Altogether, between 1936 and 1945, 
ninety-three Indian groups set up tribal governments, and seventy-
four of them had business charters. All but seven of the tribes were 
organized before 1938, indicating the intensity of the effort.”167 
 In general, the IRA fell short of most of its political and economic 
aims. It stopped allotment, but since the transfer of lands from indi-
vidual to tribal ownership was voluntary, and as appropriations for 
land consolidation and purchases were restricted, the federal gov-
ernment had a relatively limited degree of control over Indian eco-
nomic resources. Since a time limit was imposed on the referenda, 
many Indians were rushed—maybe even coerced168—into “a system of 
organization with which they were unfamiliar.”169 Others found their 
powers limited.170 Even Collier concluded in retrospect: “We had 
pressed the democratic philosophy not too far; we had not pressed it 
far enough nor skillfully enough.”171 
 Political compromises aside, the failure of the IRA to fulfill its 
aims also reflected a lack of clear guidelines. In particular, the IRA 
did not specify whether tribal governments were to follow Indian 
traditions or modern American law. As I have indicated, this omis-
sion mirrored conflicting views within the Department about 
whether the tribes should adopt modern constitutions, or follow their 
own, often unwritten, tribal traditions. Knowing very little about In-
dian ways of life, both “modernists” and “traditionalists” seem to 
have agreed that Indian tribes, no matter what governmental struc-
ture they chose, would adopt a modern economic structure. Such as-
sumptions often impeded the efforts of tribes that chose to use tradi-
tional tribal council systems to develop their economic resources. 
 Tribes that chose to write modern constitutions did not fare bet-
ter. As Robert Clinton has recently noted, “[t]ribal constitutions were 
often drafted from models provided by the BIA whose bureaucratic 
hold on the governance of Indian country was directly threatened by 
                                                                                                                    
constitution and bylaws, see Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 7, Folder 100, Yale Collection of 
Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University. 
 167. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 36; see also id. at 30-36. 
 168. Floyd A. O’Neil, The Indian New Deal: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra 
note 23, at 30, 42. 
 169. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 31. 
 170. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 163. 
 171. TAYLOR, supra note 56, at 31 (quoting JOHN COLLIER, FROM EVERY ZENITH: A 
MEMOIR 224 (1962)). For a critical evaluation of Collier’s role in forcing Indian tribes to 
come under the IRA, see Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-Determination and Subordination: The 
Past, Present, and Future of American Indian Governance, in THE STATE OF NATIVE 
AMERICA, supra note 23, at 87, 95-98. 
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the emergence of strong, autonomous Indian tribal governments.”172 
Determined “to keep their jobs and their power,” BIA bureaucrats 
thus “drafted into many tribal constitutions provisions requiring 
most or all tribal law making or resource management decisions to 
be directly approved by the Secretary of the Interior (through the 
BIA, of course).”173 Cohen wished to do away with the BIA; still, the 
failures of the IRA should not be blamed only on BIA bureaucrats. 
The pluralist Cohen, too, had initially opted for American-style con-
stitutions, believing that the structure of municipal corporations 
could easily be adapted to protect the interests of Indian tribes. 
 Finally, by forcing tribes to choose between American-style consti-
tutions and their own, the IRA did not only undermine traditional 
forms of Indian government. It also helped to intensify divisions be-
tween traditional and more assimilated factions on many reserva-
tions, erecting another obstacle on the tribes’ path to self-government 
and economic independence.174 In short, not only congressional oppo-
sition, but also the New Dealers’ unfamiliarity with Indian cultures, 
hindered the fulfillment of the radical potential of the IRA—that is, 
the creation of truly sovereign communities on Indian reservations 
(or, for Cohen, the fulfillment of socialist pluralism). 
 One compromise would become advantageous for Indian tribes. 
Since members of the Senate and House Committees on Indian Af-
fairs had no intention of granting the governing bodies of Indian 
tribes the sovereign powers enumerated in the initial draft, Collier 
was forced to negotiate language that was included in section 16 of 
the ultimate bill.175 In its final form, section 16 admitted that the 
                                                                                                                    
 172. Clinton, supra note 55, at 104. 
 173. Id. at 105. 
 174. These divisions persist to this day and are at the root of many intra-Indian con-
flicts. Michaels, supra note 151, at 1578. Russel Barsh has similarly claimed that 
“[a]rguably, tribal governments have grown stronger and somewhat more independent 
since 1934, but decision-making processes have changed little. Rooted in problems of social 
control rather than the promotion of families, justice, or equity, tribal governments are 
ideal vehicles for self-serving elites and ‘strongmen.’” Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Chal-
lenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 302 (1993). 
 175. Of particular concern to Congress was section 4 of the title on Indian Self-
Government. Section 2 of this title authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue charters 
that would grant to any Indian community any or all of the powers of government fitting 
its experience, capacities, and desires. Section 4 of the title authorized the Secretary to 
grant to any community chartered under the Act any or all of ten enumerated governmen-
tal powers. Mitchell, supra note 150, at 394 n.176, 395. A brief comparison between the ini-
tial bill and the final bill reflects these congressional concerns. Cohen and Collier viewed 
the IRA as a means for tribes to assert full control over their reservations. The final ver-
sion of the bill reflected, however, congressional intent to limit tribal jurisdiction to con-
senting members. Furthermore, the original bill contemplated that where an extensive 
consolidation of Indian land and population existed, tribes would have civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over members and nonmembers. The final version of the bill, however, as 
Chairman Wheeler of the Committee on Indian Affairs observed, eliminated all the com-
pulsory provisions, especially the right of Indian communities to make laws on their reser-
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governing bodies of tribes that would be issued IRA constitutions 
possessed not only the limited powers specified in the Act, but also 
“all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law.”176 Members of the Senate and House Committees clearly did not 
realize that they were building a foundation for a more radical un-
derstanding of Indian self-government. 
 On October 25, 1934, four months after the IRA was enacted, So-
licitor Margold published an opinion titled Powers of Indian Tribes.177 
Likely drafted by Cohen, the opinion detailed the powers that were 
“vested in the various Indian tribes under existing law.”178 As Cohen 
later noted, Powers of Indian Tribes adopted the theory that “those 
powers which [were] lawfully vested in an Indian tribe [were] not, in 
general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but 
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which [had] never 
been extinguished.”179 Tribes, in short, already held sovereign powers 
and “needed only to surrender those powers, or at least some of them, 
to the tribal corporations authorized by the IRA.”180 Some of these 
powers were historical in origin; some could be found in treaty provi-
sions or negotiations. Other powers were simply what Cohen and 
Margold believed were rights that Indian tribes had accrued since 
their basic sovereignty had been established. According to Powers of 
Indian Tribes, only a previous act of Congress limiting tribal sover-
eignty could abridge tribes’ inherent sovereignty. Yet, since Congress 
had never presumed that tribes had these sovereign powers, it was 
                                                                                                                    
vations. Gould, supra note 55, at 832-33 (referring to Bradley B. Furber, Two Promises, 
Two Propositions: The Wheeler-Howard Act as a Reconciliation of the Indian Law Civil 
War, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 211, 241-50 (1991)).  
 176. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, su-
pra note 10, at 224-25; Mitchell, supra note 150, at 394-95 n.176. 
 177. 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934). 
 178. Id. at 15. The powers included the following: power to determine the tribe’s form 
of government, id.; power to determine membership (“subject to supervision of the Secre-
tary of the Interior where rights to Federal property are involved”), id.; power to regulate 
domestic relations of its members, id.; power to prescribe rules of inheritance “[e]xcept 
with respect to allotted lands,” id.; “power to tax members of the tribe and nonmembers ac-
cepting privileges of trade or residence, to which taxes may be attached as conditions,” id.; 
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unlikely that they were limited.181 Powers of Indian Tribes thus 
turned congressional intent on its head. The lawyers of the Depart-
ment of the Interior simply announced that the powers that Congress 
refused to grant to Indian tribes were “inherent from the very begin-
ning.”182 Not only had they succeeded in protecting these powers from 
congressional intervention; under the interpretation provided by 
Powers of Indian Tribes, such powers were inherent, not delegated.183 
 Contemporary scholars have criticized Powers of Indian Tribes for 
embracing the “fiction of conquest,” and thus dispelling “any linger-
ing hopes that congressional intervention in tribes’ domestic affairs 
could be limited by treaties.”184 From a pluralistic perspective, espe-
cially in relation to Cohen’s changing interpretations of pluralism, 
however, Powers of Indian Tribes is an important transitional state-
ment. Socialist pluralism was one model for devising a plural polity. 
It envisioned the American legal system as accommodating the inter-
ests of multiple sovereign groups. It failed on Indian reservations be-
cause it was not always adaptable to the diverse tribal traditions. It 
sought to protect the political and economic interests of the Indians 
without taking full cognizance of the cultural and social systems in 
which such interests were formed, or of the unique status of these 
systems in American law. Daily interactions with Indian tribes were 
informative. Powers of Indian Tribes reflected the New Dealers’ 
growing attentiveness to the history of Indian tribes and the history 
of their relationship with the federal government. More broadly, it 
indicated an admission, albeit limited in scope, that Indian tribes 
had unique legal and political systems that federal law had to ac-
commodate. 
 Powers of Indian Tribes illustrated a transformation in Cohen’s 
view, which he more elaborately articulated in his writings during 
the late 1930s. Part III.D examines this change. It explores how 
Cohen came to see Indian tribes not only as political but also as cul-
tural groups. Cohen was the first to recognize the problems associ-
ated with his socialist pluralist model, particularly its universalist 
assumptions. This recognition was reflected first in his turn away 
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from economics and toward anthropology, and then, in his reinter-
pretation of pluralism. Cohen’s socialist pluralism assumed that fed-
eral law could accommodate, with one structure, the interests of a 
variety of groups. It neglected to notice that particular interests were 
grounded in distinct legal and political systems. In the late 1930s, 
Cohen suggested that a plural polity required a more inclusive legal 
ideal, one that would not only seek to accommodate different inter-
ests, but that would, more broadly, aim to embrace the diverse value 
systems in which such interests were formed. Such was his ideal of 
systematic pluralism. Part IV will explicate its meaning and examine 
how it influenced Cohen’s work on the Handbook. 
D.   The Importance of Culture: The IRA in Retrospect 
 Many factors, including political compromises and “a certain 
blindness,” contributed to the failures of the IRA.185 Perceptive as the 
New Dealers might have been, they sought reorganization on univer-
sal foundations. Even Cohen, who in his writings admitted the rela-
tivity of frames of reference186 and celebrated pluralism, stumbled 
when he attempted to draft policy outside his familiar context. New 
Dealers were willing to let Indian tribes run their internal affairs, 
but the system they devised was an American system. Even when 
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 186. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense], re-
printed in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 33. 
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recognizing particular differences, they viewed the general frame-
work in universal, absolute terms. They were critical of American in-
stitutions, but the alternatives they devised were no less American. 
 One of the major drawbacks of the IRA was the New Dealers’ na-
ïveté with respect to Indian cultures, customs, and laws. Cohen, for 
one, came to the New Deal believing that racial and ethnic tensions 
would disappear once class conflict was resolved. His daily encoun-
ters with Indian tribes, particularly, I suspect, his study of tribal 
constitutions in preparation for writing new ones,187 taught him oth-
erwise. As early as 1935, Cohen admitted that American law repre-
sented not only the force of the state utilized by a dominant capitalist 
class, but also the force of the state utilized for the hegemony of cul-
ture.188 Given the multiplicity of social (economic, political, cultural) 
interests, he wrote, the multiple meanings of legal concepts were 
tools in the hands of powerful lawmaking agencies. They gave a con-
cept one meaning when applied to one interest group, and another 
when applied to a different group.189 Recognizing, with pluralists, the 
incompleteness of human knowledge,190 Cohen thus urged the under-
standing of legal reality, and hence the definition of legal rules, as re-
flecting a variety of interrelated particular and collective interests.191 
Such a definition required, of course, a better comprehension of these 
interests. 
 In the hope of redefining legal concepts according to a complex ar-
ray of individual and collective experiences, Cohen turned to the so-
cial sciences.192 In 1937, he published an article that he considered to 
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be “a list of jobs that an administrator would like to see done on the 
scientific [anthropological] front”; it was a “‘help wanted’ advertise-
ment.”193 Already in 1933, the Department of the Interior, under Col-
lier’s leadership, sought information from anthropologists, particu-
larly with respect to the structure of tribal governments. Cohen 
found their advice “extremely useful.”194 “I believe,” he wrote, “that 
when we are finally in a position to move ahead with our legislative 
program on the different Indian jurisdictions they will prove invalu-
able, and should be made the basis of follow up inquiries.”195 In 1937, 
once the basic IRA structure was in place, Cohen undertook such a 
follow-up inquiry, this time, however, assigning a more active role to 
anthropologists. In the tradition of Bronislaw Malinowski and Franz 
Boas, Cohen called for “functional” field studies, “a movement away 
from two types of study: the naive reporting and classification of 
striking human peculiarities; and the more sophisticated attempt to 
trace the historical origin, evolution, and diffusion of ‘complexes.’”196 
Instead of these types of study, Cohen asked anthropologists to help 
administrators “trace the social consequences of diverse customs, be-
liefs, rituals, social arrangements and patterns of human conduct.”197 
 Cohen urged anthropologists to provide the Department with facts 
helpful to the development of policy. Specifically, he believed that the 
Indian conception of property rights, which anthropologists could ex-
plicate, should be enforced on Indian reservations, rather than the 
American ideal of private property. Similarly, Cohen believed that 
anthropology would show the benefit of leisure-like economic activi-
ties, to the disappointment of BIA officials—as he sarcastically 
noted—who for decades had attempted to teach Indians to be “good” 
farmers or stockmen.198 Overall, it seems that Cohen sought scientific 
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proof for the priority of communal values over possessive individual-
ism,199 a testimony that socialist pluralism was a feasible program. 
 While Cohen’s socialist pluralism lurked in the shadows, his writ-
ings already indicated a growing attentiveness to culture. For exam-
ple, Cohen suggested that New Dealers should seek to accommodate 
the historical and ethnological groupings of the Indians. He believed 
that education policies should aim to maintain Indian culture, val-
ues, and history. He further argued that health services should con-
sider traditional Indian medicine, and he called on anthropologists to 
resurrect “forms of Indian art and recreation which [could] serve in 
modern life the same functions that they [had] served decades ago,” 
or discover and invent their modern equivalents.200 
 Cohen did not think that law should mirror or imitate Indian cul-
ture. Rather, he believed that policymakers should determine the 
functional relevance of various aspects of Indian culture. They should 
examine Indian social organization—“the functional significance of 
family, clan, and tribal groupings as social determinants in the pro-
duction, distribution, and use of property, as well as in the non-
economic human relationships of education, religion, play, sex, and 
companionship.”201 They should look to Indian art as an indication of 
the motivations and purposes of the craftsman, and recognize its sig-
nificance as an individualizing or socializing force. They should ex-
plore the nature of Indian laws, the incentives to obedience and their 
efficacy, the techniques of law enforcement, and the relationship be-
tween legal sanctions and other social forces. Finally, Cohen urged 
reformers to look to Indian political systems for models of institu-
tions of social organization and collective behavior.202 Three years af-
ter he joined the Department of the Interior, Cohen, in short, sug-
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gested that New Dealers should aim beyond the establishment of 
self-governing socialist communities; they should aim to understand 
Indian cultures so that they could promulgate laws and policies that 
would better fit Indian traditions. 
 The radical nature of Cohen’s transformation—from politics to 
culture—was captured in the reaction of anthropologists. Refusing to 
publish Cohen’s appeal to anthropologists, Leslie Spier, the Editor of 
The American Anthropologist explained that there was no room for 
applied anthropology in their journal.203 His concerns ran deeper. The 
editor obviously understood the radical implications of Cohen’s grow-
ing attentiveness to cultural interests. Underlying functional an-
thropology was an acceptance, even celebration, of the plurality of so-
cial, cultural, political, and economic interests that characterized so-
ciety. It endorsed diversity, not merely as an empirical fact to be con-
strained through universal structures, but as a constitutive element 
of society that should be normatively embraced. Robert Lowie, who 
found Cohen’s piece “admirable, both in form and substance,”204 took 
pains to explicate its problematic nature. Anthropologists, he told 
Cohen, varied greatly “in their individual attitude towards ‘applied 
anthropology.’”205 Many of them—especially in America—believed 
that most tribes were weak numerically; thus, especially in the ab-
sence of permanent government policy, they expected that the elimi-
nation of tribes as cultural entities was “a matter of relatively few 
years.”206 In the view of these anthropologists, Lowie’s letter implied, 
Cohen’s advocacy of applied anthropology could impede gradual cul-
tural assimilation.207 
 Unlike economic and political interests, which could be conceived 
as universal, cultural interests were particular. To emphasize their 
functional significance was to engage in a normative argument about 
pluralism, which even Lowie found troubling. There was a chasm, he 
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explained to Cohen, “between a normative and a purely descriptive 
approach.”208 Like Cohen, Lowie believed that “the ethnographer 
should fully expound whatever he knows that might be pertinent to 
the purposes of officialdom.”209 Still, Lowie questioned, should the 
ethnographer go any further? For example, “[h]ow can the anthro-
pologist, qua anthropologist, learn and advise which craft activities 
should be stimulated in response to expectable demands of the mar-
ket?”210 Should the New Dealers, Lowie’s questions implied, aim be-
yond protecting the economic and political interests of Indian tribes? 
Should they embrace cultural pluralism as a normative ideal? Four 
short years earlier, Cohen’s reply might have been different, but 
when Lowie asked the question, Cohen was already drawing on an-
thropological field studies to develop a pluralist approach (systematic 
pluralism) that would celebrate both socialist and cultural pluralism. 
 Part IV investigates Cohen’s systematic pluralism and how it was 
reflected in the Handbook. Informed by cultural pluralism, Cohen’s 
systematic pluralism recognized the multiplicity of value systems 
within which diverse cultural interests were embedded and urged 
the expansion of any given system to include the values of other sys-
tems. It envisioned law as encompassing the diverse value systems 
that characterized American society. Part IV.A describes this ap-
proach. Drawing on Cohen’s writings on ethics and systematic rela-
tivism, it grounds Cohen’s new interpretation of pluralism in his 
novel ethical ideal—a socialized morality. Cohen’s socialized morality 
rejected atomistic or individualistic understandings of society and in-
stead emphasized the possibility of social integration (or the integra-
tion of systems). Such an approach, I suggest, was informed not only 
by Cohen’s interactions with Indian tribes, but also by his concerns 
about the plight of Jews in Europe. Part IV.B explores the relation-
ship between Cohen’s systematic pluralism and his agenda for the 
Handbook. It further examines the reaction to Cohen’s approach, 
particularly an attempt by the Justice Department, once the nature 
of the Handbook was revealed, to halt its publication. Part IV.C sug-
gests that in the Handbook Cohen sought not only to celebrate di-
verse cultural interests, but also to articulate a theory of group rights 
that would protect different cultural systems. It meant to allow Na-
tive Americans, as well as Jewish Americans, to bring their different 
values into the American polity. Aiming at the inclusion of histori-
cally marginalized voices, the main theme of the Handbook was that 
a long line of conquerors, including the federal government, had al-
ready recognized tribal rights. This recognition, however, also en-
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tailed the subjection of tribal affairs to congressional control. Cohen’s 
attempt to universalize a theory of group rights indeed tended to ob-
scure the role of particular groups in actively determining and pro-
tecting their own rights. As Part V will show, ultimately, this at-
tempt also led Cohen to articulate a new interpretation of plural-
ism—comparative pluralism. 
IV.   “THE INTELLECTUAL EQUIPMENT OF A GENERATION”: SYSTEMATIC 
PLURALISM AND THE HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
A.   Systematic Pluralism 
 Cohen’s growing attentiveness to the complexity of legal reality as 
reflecting a variety of social, cultural, economic, and political inter-
ests helped to transform his understanding of pluralism. Gradually, 
he began to suggest that diverse interests were not contained within 
one value (or legal) system. Rather, they were spread over different 
systems. For example, concepts like communal holding of property 
meant one thing for socialists and another for Indians. The success of 
the IRA thus depended not only on the establishment of stable eco-
nomic and political structures on Indian reservations. It further re-
quired an understanding of the cultural and emotional meaning that 
Indian tribes attributed to tribal sovereignty. “It is extremely likely 
that organized Indian tribes will continue to exist,” Cohen wrote in 
1939, “as long as American democracy exists and as long as the 
American people are unwilling to use the army to carry out Indian 
policies.”211 More important, they would exist “provided that the In-
dians themselves feel that tribal governments satisfy important hu-
man wants.”212 The life expectancy of various tribal constitutions 
could thus be figured, according to Cohen, by assigning numbers to a 
variety of factors: 
[T]he extent to which the organized tribe ministers to the common 
economic needs of the people, the degree in which the organized 
tribe satisfies recreational and cultural wants, the extent and effi-
ciency of municipal services which the tribe renders, the general 
social solidarity of the community, and the vigor with which the 
tribal government expresses the dissatisfactions of the people and 
organizes the wishes of the people along rational lines.213 
 A (tribal) constitution became, in short, “the formal structure of a 
reality that exists in human hearts.”214 So, Cohen proclaimed, “[a]n 
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Indian constitution will exist as long as there remains in human 
hearts a community of interdependence, of common interests, aspira-
tions, hopes, and fears, in realms of art and politics, work and 
play.”215 Only the Indians—not the administration—could establish 
stable tribal governments; and only when they did, could one talk 
about self-determination and pluralism. 
 The recognition of a multiplicity of value systems raised impor-
tant questions about the resolution of conflicts that could transpire 
between such systems. In a letter to Collier dated March 13, 1939, 
Cohen expressed his concerns. “It is because I don’t want to see ei-
ther black or white suppressed or liquidated,” Cohen wrote, “that I 
oppose any absolutism which would make either white or black 
‘false’, ‘unreal’ or ‘secondary’. It is perhaps because I . . . love . . . di-
versity and ‘irrepressible conflicts’ that I reject absolutism.”216 Con-
flicts, however, had to “be put on a stable basis if they [were] not to 
end in the annihilation of one side or both.”217 “I think,” Cohen con-
cluded, that “[t]he relativist approach . . . justifies the stable kind of 
conflict that we find in music, art or mathematics, where neither side 
is ever annihilated.”218 
 Like earlier discussions of political pluralism,219 socialist plural-
ism—Cohen’s model for the IRA—was premised on a categorical de-
scription of conflict as a struggle over limited economic resources: 
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employers against employees, corporations against labor unions, 
producers against consumers, and Indians against non-Indians. The 
solution was universal and “scientific”: redistribution. It seldom 
meant more than a repositioning of two sides to a conflict. It ne-
glected to notice that interests were embedded in distinct legal and 
political systems. Given the multiplicity of cultures, groups, and 
forms of knowledge, gradually, Cohen came to find unfeasible the as-
sumption that one could provide a universal solution for diverse con-
flicts. Although grounded in theories of pluralism, such a solution, 
Cohen’s letter to Collier suggested, forced assimilation. How, then, 
should one accommodate diversity? By the late 1930s, Cohen articu-
lated an ideal of systematic pluralism, or what he labeled systematic 
relativism, as a model for realizing diverse interests. Informed by 
earlier theories of cultural pluralism, particularly Horace Kallen’s 
orchestral vision of America,220 it was, in Cohen’s view, a “principle of 
logical tolerance.”221 
 Building on his 1935 critique of abstract concepts as tools of cul-
tural and political oppression,222 Cohen’s principle of systematic rela-
tivism recognized that the meaning of concepts depended upon sys-
tems of reference that were external to them, and that many such 
systems were possible. Legal change thus required not only the un-
derstanding of legal reality as a variety of interrelated particular and 
collective experiences, but also the reconstitution of different legal 
systems as broader and more inclusive. If different philosophical sys-
tems could be increased in scope to maintain common content, then 
the distinction between the meaning given to abstract concepts 
within each of them was one of degree—of emotions and attitudes—
not of kind. Such, Cohen believed, was also the difference between 
“red” and “white” America.223 
 Systematic pluralism was supported by a particular theory of eth-
ics, which Cohen articulated in the mid-1930s. Throughout his life, 
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Cohen rejected moral positivism and instead emphasized the inter-
dependence of legal science and ethical criticism. Law, he believed, 
should be grounded in a normative system.224 Cohen’s early writings 
sought to anchor legal criticism in hedonism.225 As he turned away 
from socialist pluralism, his ethical ideal changed, too. Instead of he-
donism (a rather monistic theory), Cohen adopted a “socialized mo-
rality”—an ethical theory that sought to integrate “the life of society 
as traditional morality has integrated the lives of individuals.”226 
 Traditional morality, with its focus on individual life, presupposed 
a metaphysical dogma, “the dogma that the individual is an ultimate 
unity and society an ultimate plurality.”227 “[A]ll the adjustments, 
balances, and compromises which are the substance of morality” 
were thus described as taking place “within an individual life.”228 So-
cial balance, particularly the redistribution of wealth, was preor-
dained to be unjust (though similar balance within a single life—that 
is, “the sacrifice of today’s pleasure for tomorrow’s”—was commend-
able).229 Cohen’s alternative was a socialized morality. Its metaphysi-
cal dogma revealed “something of the unity of the individual in soci-
ety itself and something of the plurality of society in the individual 
life.”230 By admitting that adjustment and integration of diverse in-
terests were possible (according to individualized morality such was 
indeed the essence of individual life), socialized morality made the 
normative endorsement of cultural pluralism less threatening to the 
traditional understanding of society. “The possibility of a social inte-
gration of conflicting interests is substantiated,” Cohen proclaimed, 
“by the integration of conflicting interests in an individual life.”231 
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 The central point of Cohen’s socialized morality was the rejection 
of individualism, because, as his argument implied, individualistic 
theories resisted pluralism. Some positively denied pluralism, others 
normatively urged moral consensus as an attractive ideal. Still oth-
ers created procedural mechanisms that could presumably constrain 
pluralism.232 Instead, Cohen wanted to guarantee that law favored 
solutions that encouraged the flourishing of diverse social ideas, be-
liefs, and values; he wanted law to promote solutions that would sus-
tain the individual as a modern social being in a pluralistic society. 
Every law, Cohen thus argued, should be examined in light of its ef-
fects on the enterprise of social integration. “Today, more than ever 
before,” Cohen would write in the midst of the Second World War, 
“we need to study the legal relations that have served to bind to-
gether in common cause and common effort peoples of different races, 
different creeds, different social structures, and different ways of 
life.”233 This was the premise of his systematic pluralism. 
 Cohen’s systematic pluralism was an attempt to articulate a uni-
versal ideal (a common cause) that would include all particular sys-
tems of reference. It accepted cultural pluralism, but rejected separa-
tism, that is, the idea that different cultures were detached from 
each other. It opposed the forced assimilation of all cultural systems 
into one, but envisioned all systems becoming one. The reasons for 
such an “in-between” approach reached beyond federal Indian policy. 
Like his attraction to socialist pluralism, Cohen’s fascination with 
systematic pluralism was influenced by his own sense of identity. In-
deed, Cohen’s new model of pluralism was not limited to the accom-
modation of Indian interests. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, as 
European Jews were facing ever expanding economic, political, and 
physical sanctions, Cohen also criticized exclusionary immigration 
laws—laws that barred refugees from finding a haven within Amer-
ica’s borders. Challenging nativist arguments, Cohen emphasized the 
important contributions of immigrants to the social and economic 
welfare of the country and urged the admission of European refugees 
into the body politic of the nation.234 
 In his writings on the problem of exclusionary immigration laws, 
Cohen sought to extend his pluralist approach beyond labor unions 
and Indian tribes to ethnic communities. His works, however, re-
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ferred to European rather than Jewish refugees, an evasion that re-
flected not only Cohen’s political concerns about anti-Semitism, but 
also his continuing ambivalence toward Kallen’s cultural plural-
ism.235 As a Jewish American, Cohen always felt the tension between 
the preservation of one’s particular identity and the desire to be ac-
cepted as an American. Motivated by such a desire, his socialist plu-
ralist ideal aimed to create a universal economic, if not also political, 
structure on Indian reservations almost to the extent of forced as-
similation. In the 1940s, informed by his experience in administering 
the IRA, Cohen, the lawyer for Indian tribes, was willing to accept 
the plurality of cultural systems. The particular heritage of every 
group was the premise of his systematic pluralism. Yet, his eager-
ness as a Jewish American to be admitted into the polity, as well as 
the cosmopolitanism he inherited from his father, limited the scope of 
this new approach. Cohen rejected separatism and instead sought to 
show that legal systems could be expanded to include the voices of 
various groups. Such was his vision when he was asked to head the 
survey of federal Indian law and to write the Handbook. 
 As if admitting the lessons learned during the first years of the 
Indian New Deal, the introduction to the Handbook (which was 
signed by Margold but likely drafted by Cohen) noted that the IRA 
reflected a change in the conceptualization of law. It attempted to 
compensate for “many of the evils resulting from attempts to impose 
a uniform pattern of treatment upon groups with different wants, 
and thus [had] strengthened the tendency towards special considera-
tion of the legal problems of particular tribes.”236 Indian tribes, in 
short, taught Cohen and his colleagues that law was “made for, and 
in large part by, diverse groups with divergent economic interests, 
political institutions, and levels of cultural attainment.”237 
 As Part IV.B suggests, Cohen intended the Handbook to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Indian tribes 
and the federal government, and to expand the scope of the American 
legal system to embrace values and assumptions embedded in tribal 
systems. Such aims reflected Cohen’s systematic pluralism, with its 
emphasis on the need to make value systems more comprehensive, as 
well as his ideal of socialized morality, with its emphasis on social in-
tegration.238 Cohen believed that a better understanding of the rela-
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tionship between Indians and the federal government would permit 
the inclusion and integration of their voices into the body politic of 
the nation. Not everyone, however, shared Cohen’s hopes. Still, from 
Cohen’s perspective, in the revolutionary politics of the New Deal, 
the IRA was an act of liberation; the Handbook was its social con-
tract.239  
B.   Integration and Discord 
 The opportunity to write the Handbook surfaced during the au-
tumn of 1938. Carl McFarland, Assistant Attorney General, and 
Charles E. Collett, the Chief of the Trial Section of the Lands Divi-
sion, asked Cohen to organize and head a survey of federal Indian 
law. The survey was to involve the compilation of statutes dealing 
with Indians that had never been compiled or codified hitherto, and 
their annotation with reference to cases, Attorneys General’s opin-
ions, and Solicitors’ opinions. Based on these materials, a handbook 
was to be prepared for the legal and administrative officers of the In-
dian Service, who, before 1938, were forced to look for legal authori-
ties in hundreds of scattered sources.240 After some deliberation, the 
work began, as a cooperative project of the Lands Division of the De-
partment of Justice and the Department of the Interior under 
Cohen’s supervision.241 
 Cohen admitted that “the task of systematizing this law and pre-
paring a comprehensive handbook on the subject” was “one of pecu-
liar difficulty.”242 No textbook or treatise on the subject had ever been 
written, and as Cohen had learned in the preceding five years, the 
law relating to Indian affairs was complex and difficult.243 However, 
the potential uses of the survey and the proposed handbook made the 
endeavor worthwhile. 
 As Jill Martin has recently noted, Cohen envisioned “a book that 
would last into the future, setting forth how the laws had developed 
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over time and explaining the legal interests of all parties involved.”244 
The handbook was to be an evolving treatise: a book that would rep-
resent not only federal and state regulation of Indian affairs, but also 
changing Indian customs and laws. A statute for the American ideal 
of democracy245—which at the time Cohen interpreted through the 
mediation of his concept of systematic pluralism—the treatise was 
meant to familiarize lawyers with the diverse aspects of Indian law. 
The proposed handbook, Cohen hoped, would restore an age-old heri-
tage to its warranted status. Federal and state laws, judicial and 
administrative decisions would then aim to fulfill the promise of this 
tradition.246 
 Not everyone shared Cohen’s aspirations. Indeed, Cohen’s eager-
ness (and the willingness of the Department of the Interior) to pro-
tect the rights of Indian tribes caused much aggravation to many in 
the Justice Department. They believed that the handbook should be 
written to assist those attorneys in their department who litigated 
cases against Indians.247 Cohen’s prophecy, during the initial delib-
erations, that “this project would be resented by certain Justice De-
partment employees”248 was quickly fulfilled. From the start, the Jus-
tice Department raised a variety of bureaucratic obstacles.249 Then, 
as McFarland, who had a keen interest in the project, left the De-
partment, and with a Second World War on the horizon, “there 
wasn’t much interest in this ‘Indian thing.’”250 On October 31, 1939, 
eight months into the project, Cohen was called before Assistant At-
torney General Norman M. Littell, who advised him that “he was 
dissatisfied with the work of the project and had determined to put 
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an end to it.”251 On the following day, Cohen was “publicly relieved of 
[his] command in the presence of [his] staff, which was then assigned 
to various other units of the Lands Division.”252 Attacks on Cohen’s 
scholarship and his character “before [his] superiors in the Interior 
Department and before various senators and other officials” suc-
ceeded the termination of the project.253 
 For the most part, Littell’s sudden change of heart—only weeks 
before the incident he had indicated that the work was “very inter-
esting, and . . . quite valuable”254—was due to his growing concerns 
about the use that Indian tribes could make of the proposed hand-
book.255 The Attorney General formally explained that the work on 
the handbook was terminated “because the drafts of chapters sub-
mitted were of such inferior quality that no practicable amount of re-
visions would make them adequate to serve the needs of attorneys ei-
ther in [the Justice Department] . . . or the Department of the Inte-
rior.”256 
 Cohen’s superiors in the Department of the Interior were not im-
pressed by these accusations. Acting Secretary E.K. Burlew advised 
Littell that in view of their knowledge of Cohen’s prior work, Solicitor 
Margold and Acting Solicitor Frederic Kirgis found it difficult to ac-
cept the view that the material submitted was “hopelessly worth-
less.”257 They thus “requested an opportunity fully to examine into 
the matter on the merits.”258 Following this examination, the De-
partment of the Interior and its “pro-Indian” lawyers took over the 
project.259 
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 Cohen and his team completed the Statutory Compilation of the 
Indian Law Survey: A Compendium of Federal Laws and Treaties Re-
lating to Indians in 1940, and “[a]fter intensive work by some forty-
seven staff members and contributors,”260 the Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law was “printed and officially released on August 25, 1941” 
under the auspices of the Department of the Interior.261 In a letter 
written after the events, Cohen noted that he was “trying to regain 
the mark of a civilized man,” that is, “the capacity to doubt one’s own 
first principles, which [had] entirely evaporated in the course of a 
year’s strain of battle . . . over the [Handbook] . . . with colleagues, 
whose livelihood and prestige were threatened by the publication of 
trade secrets.”262 “It was a tough and dirty fight while it lasted,” 
Cohen concluded, “and the ensuing dolce far niente is without blem-
ish.”263 
 Writing in retrospect, Felix Frankfurter observed that the Hand-
book was an attempt to bring “meaning and reason out of the vast 
hodge-podge of treaties, statutes, judicial and administrative rulings, 
and unrecorded practice in which the intricacies and perplexities, the 
confusions and injustices of the law governing Indians lay con-
cealed.”264 While the Handbook did not “purport to be a cyclopedia,” it 
was, as the editors of the 1982 edition noted, “a thorough and com-
prehensive treatise that attended to virtually every nook and cranny 
of the field.”265  
 As Part IV.C demonstrates, with respect to Cohen’s changing in-
terpretations of pluralism, the importance of the Handbook was its 
proclamation, supported by historical evidence, that Indian tribes 
were sovereign bodies, with “all the powers of self-government of any 
sovereignty except insofar as those powers have been modified or re-
pealed by act of Congress or treaty.”266 Ironically, Cohen’s argument 
endorsed the fiction of conquest, thus subjecting tribal affairs to con-
gressional control. As Part IV.C shows, such a claim was grounded in 
a particular theory of group rights, which Cohen articulated in the 
1940s. As his analysis became fixated, however, on the need to pro-
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tect particular group rights, his systematic pluralist assumption—
that value systems could be enlarged to include other systems, ulti-
mately becoming one—gradually disintegrated. Part V will examine 
Cohen’s alternative—comparative pluralism—and how it informed 
the drafting of the ICCA. 
C.   Systematic Pluralism, Revisited: A Group Right To Be Different 
 The major theme of the Handbook and of Cohen’s writings during 
the early 1940s was that the history of Indian nations and the his-
tory of international law provided ample precedents for the protec-
tion of the collective rights of Indian tribes. According to Cohen, the 
history of Indian nations revealed that the constitutions written by 
the Iroquois confederacy and other peoples preceded the American 
Constitution and were indeed the hidden roots of civilization.267 He 
further suggested that a long line of conquerors, including the federal 
government, recognized these constitutions. Traced back to the 
“Spanish School” of international law, this recognition, according to 
Cohen, indicated that both American law and international law were 
sufficiently expansive to embrace a conception of group rights. Cohen 
admitted that American Indians were widely oppressed under Span-
ish rule, but he asserted that “the oppression was in defiance of, 
rather than pursuant to, the laws of Spain.”268 While the American 
colonies “appealed to the traditional legal rights of Englishmen when 
they rebelled against a royal administration that had violated those 
rights,” Cohen wrote, “the peoples of Latin America appealed again 
and again to the humane Spanish legal ideal of racial equality in re-
belling against administrations which had been faithless to that 
ideal.”269 
 Many have accused Cohen of endorsing in his historical analysis 
the fiction of conquest, that is, the idea that while tribes initially 
possessed all the powers of a sovereign nation, after conquest, these 
powers were subject to qualification by the conqueror, for example, 
the federal government.270 Cohen’s writings during the early 1940s 
clearly supported the argument that the conquerors were the arbi-
ters of Indian rights. Yet, Cohen did not seek to encourage congres-
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sional intervention in Indian affairs. He truly wanted to defend tribal 
rights. Why, then, did he subject tribal affairs to congressional con-
trol? The reasons, I suspect, reach back to Cohen’s systematic plural-
ism, with its ethical grounding and its relationship to Cohen’s sense 
of identity as a Jewish American.  
 On its face, it seems that Cohen adopted the fiction of conquest to 
de-radicalize the Handbook’s argument in defense of tribal rights. 
Motivated by his faith in the feasibility of expanding legal and moral 
systems, Cohen hoped that by showing that the protection of tribal 
rights had been an important aspect of different legal traditions, in-
cluding the American one, he would gain support for his advocacy of 
group rights, a claim that reached back to the IRA, particularly to 
Powers of Indian Tribes.271 He wanted the Handbook to be a social 
contract between Indians and non-Indians, a social contract that 
would protect the communal rights of Indian tribes. In this context, 
history was a means to an end. Cohen hoped that the display of his-
torical evidence would support the protection of tribal rights, includ-
ing the right to self-government, without appearing—amidst the 
growing expansion of federal powers during World War II—to 
threaten congressional powers. 
 According to Cohen, his concerns were informed by his experience 
during his first year in office. As he was studying the legal rights of 
Indian tribes—a study that was to serve as a guide in the drafting of 
tribal constitutions under the IRA—Cohen had concluded that “the 
laws and court decisions clearly recognized that Indian tribes [had] 
all the governmental rights of any state or municipality except in so 
far as those rights [had] been curtailed or qualified by Act of Con-
gress or by treaty, and such qualifications [were] relatively minor.”272 
His work was adopted as the Solicitor’s Opinion and then approved 
by the proper authorities in the Department of the Interior. Yet, all 
copies were carefully hidden away in a cabinet, and, Cohen sarcasti-
cally added, “when an Indian was found reading this opinion, the 
copy was forthwith taken from his hands and placed under lock and 
key.”273 In such an atmosphere, Cohen consciously sought to provide 
a passive facade for his Handbook, suggesting that it did not rewrite 
Indian law; rather, it uncovered what “every schoolboy” already 
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knew—that a long line of conquerors had left tribal sovereignty in-
tact.274 Systematic pluralism was thus feasible.  
 There was, I believe, a more personal (and less instrumental) rea-
son for Cohen’s endorsement of the fiction of conquest. Cohen came to 
the New Deal to promote tribal self-government. Almost a decade in 
the service of the Department, as well as the rise of totalitarianism 
in Europe, helped to shift his focus from sovereignty to racial dis-
crimination. In the late 1930s, Cohen no longer believed that racial 
tensions would disappear once social or political conflicts were re-
solved. Rather, his ideal of systematic pluralism envisioned social 
and cultural integration as an alternative to discrimination.  
 Cohen knew that the fiction of conquest meant that sovereigns 
(for example, the federal government) could intervene in tribal af-
fairs. He embraced it, I suspect, not only because it de-radicalized the 
message of the Handbook. Rather, endorsing the fiction of conquest 
allowed Cohen to celebrate tribal rights, on the one hand, and to ar-
gue, on the other hand, that tribes were not excluded from the main-
stream of American life. It laid a foundation for a more general the-
ory of group rights; a theory that admitted diversity, denied separa-
tism, and made the sovereign the force of social integration. Accord-
ing to Cohen’s narrative, such a conception of group rights was al-
ready an element of American law.  
 The limits of Cohen’s systematic pluralism, I have suggested, 
were determined by his aspirations as a Jewish American to be in-
cluded in the polity.275 For Cohen—the pluralist, but also the Jewish 
American, who was at the time struggling to keep American borders 
open to European refugees—both the possibility of inclusion and the 
role of the sovereign in battling racial discrimination were vital. “The 
victim of economic oppression may be buoyed up in the struggle by 
the hope that he can improve his economic status,” he wrote in 
1940.276 “The victim of political oppression may change his political 
affiliation,” and “[t]he victim of religious oppression,” Cohen wished 
to believe, “may embrace the religion of his oppressors.”277 Yet, “[t]he 
victim of racial persecution” could not “change his race.”278 “For these 
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victims,” Cohen proclaimed, there was “no sanctuary and no es-
cape.”279 To be integrated into the polity, these victims needed the 
protection of the sovereign. 
 However, “since all the minority groups that [had] reason to fear 
discriminatory legislation [made] up together a great majority of 
[the] population,” Cohen maintained that at “the heart of our democ-
ratic institutions” was an asserted right (of individuals and groups) 
to be immune from racial discrimination.280 The long history de-
scribed in the Handbook culminated in the Fifth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,281 which, 
according to Cohen, endorsed this asserted right.282 “[T]he right to be 
immune from racial discrimination by governmental agencies,” Mar-
gold similarly wrote in the introduction to the Handbook, “is an es-
sential part of the fabric of democratic government in the United 
States.”283 
 With the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, many liberals were 
moving toward rights consciousness.284 Cohen, who never disavowed 
his socialist convictions, adopted a collective (or group), rather than 
an individualistic, conception of rights.285 His systematic pluralism 
focused on the possibility that any given value system could be ex-
panded to encompass other value systems. In similar manner, in the 
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legal realm, Cohen sought not only to acknowledge the existence of 
different cultures, but also to articulate a comprehensive legal doc-
trine that would protect them. A group right to be different—
culturally, politically, and socially—was Cohen’s choice. His writings 
during the 1940s suggested that an individualistic conception of 
rights could not attend to the multiplicity of competing cultural, so-
cial, economic, and political systems that characterized American so-
ciety. Social integration accordingly required the celebration of the 
rights of groups to assert their differences. Such a collective concep-
tion of rights, Cohen also wished to show, was already an element of 
the American legal system. By way of introduction to the Handbook, 
he suggested that it reflected “a set of beliefs that [formed] the intel-
lectual equipment of a generation”:286 
a belief that our treatment of the Indian in the past is not some-
thing of which a democracy can be proud, a belief that the protec-
tion of minority rights and the substitution of reason and agree-
ment for force and dictation represent a contribution to civiliza-
tion, a belief that confusion and ignorance in fields of law are allies 
of despotism, a belief that it is the duty of the Government to aid 
oppressed groups in the understanding and appreciation of their 
legal rights, a belief that understanding of the law, in Indian fields 
as elsewhere, requires more than textual exegesis, requires appre-
ciation of history and understanding of economic, political, social, 
and moral problems. These beliefs represent . . . the American 
mind in our generation as it impinges upon one tiny segment of 
the many problems which modern democracy faces.287 
 At the dawn of the 1940s, Cohen portrayed the protection of mi-
norities’ rights not only as a fundamental legal principle, but also as 
an already existing feature of American law. “[T]he American com-
munity is made up of wolves and sheep, and the sheep have got to be 
protected against the wolves,” Cohen believed.288 As Russel Barsh has 
noted, Cohen “was a man with a mission . . . . The law as he con-
ceived it was an evolving instrument of human progress which, like 
any tool, worked best if well understood and properly used.”289 Ac-
cordingly, Cohen did not only include legal decisions in the Hand-
book. Rather, he annotated them to support his ideal of systematic 
pluralism and its legal correlate—a conception of group rights.  
 When he joined the New Deal, Cohen saw on Indian reservations 
a socialist structure that he wished the nation to imitate; he saw on 
Indian reservations what he wished to prescribe for American soci-
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ety. In the 1940s, as he was seeking to promote his ideal of system-
atic pluralism, especially his argument in favor of group rights, he 
found supporting evidence, again, on Indian reservations. Cohen’s 
history of the relationship between Indian tribes and the different co-
lonial conquerors, in short, unraveled his ideal of systematic plural-
ism. 
 Many scholars have more recently sought to identify in American 
legal history a concept of rights that could embrace not only the 
Lockean, liberal notion of individual rights, but also a conception of 
group rights.290 Some have suggested that a communitarian tradition 
that stressed the priority of communal values informed American 
law throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.291 Oth-
ers have argued that a republican tradition that emphasized civic 
virtue and endorsed notions of individual and collective rights influ-
enced American legal thought.292 Still others claim that liberalism it-
self supports group rights.293  
 Cohen’s theory of rights drew on his ethical conception of the good 
society and his ideal of systematic pluralism. It grounded human 
equality in the celebration of human differences. The state was not a 
neutral night-watchman. Rather, it was charged with the affirmative 
protection of group rights. Lest he be misunderstood, Cohen empha-
sized that such an image of the state did not sanction the trust doc-
trine, which viewed Indians as wards of the state. The protection of 
group rights was thus subject to the limitation that it was for the 
welfare of those protected and in their interests.294 
 Rights, in short, were need-based and historically construed 
through open social dialogues, defined and redefined through the in-
teraction of particular groups and the relationship between groups 
and the polity. In his writings during the 1940s and in the Hand-
book, Cohen elaborated and celebrated such a dynamic ideal of group 
(and individual) rights. Articulating his systematic pluralist ideal, 
these writings aimed to show that law was more than words and 
more than brute force. Law was a system, or an organization, which 
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translated diverse visions of social reality and thus made the impact 
of social forces more predictable.295 
 Cohen’s ideal of group rights as a means of social integration as-
signed, however, little active role to groups in determining and pro-
tecting their rights. Focusing on the expansion of systems, system-
atic pluralism was premised on the plausibility of universal solu-
tions. It admitted the particularity of different systems, but sug-
gested that distinctions disappeared once all systems grew more in-
clusive, ultimately becoming one. The fiction of conquest, too, implied 
that as the voice of the conqueror became dominant, the voices of 
particular groups became almost irrelevant. Notably, the voices of 
Indian tribes were missing from the Handbook. 
 Ironically, critics of Cohen’s aims pointed him toward a more ex-
plicit recognition of the importance of particular voices. For one 
thing, many rejected Cohen’s appeal to open America’s borders to 
European refugees because more lenient immigration laws were con-
ceived not as making the polity more inclusive, but as protecting the 
particular interests of Jewish refugees. Beginning in the 1940s, the 
Indian New Deal, too, was coming under attack as preserving the 
particular status of Indian tribes.296 In the mid-1940s, Cohen was 
thus searching for an approach that would better mediate the de-
mands of particularism and universalism. Coinciding with his work 
on the ICCA, his quest ultimately led him to articulate an ideal of 
comparative pluralism. It sought to mediate conflicting value sys-
tems not by expanding one system to include others, but by encour-
aging dialogue and translation between and among distinct systems. 
 Part V examines Cohen’s comparative pluralism and its relation-
ship to the drafting of the ICCA. Part V.A describes the Act. Pre-
sumably accepting the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes, as it 
was articulated in the Handbook, the ICCA waived the sovereign 
immunity of the federal government and allowed Indian tribes to sue 
for damages for their relinquished lands. Many have since criticized 
the ICCA for restrictions it imposed on the remedies available to In-
dian tribes and for its significant role in promoting the policy of ter-
mination. As Part V.B suggests, for Cohen, the Act was symbolic. In-
tellectually, he believed that the establishment of an investigatory 
commission—rather than an adversarial body—to hear and deter-
mine tribal land claims against the federal government would illus-
trate the importance of agency and the possibility of communication 
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and translation between and among distinct value systems. These 
were the premises of his developing ideal of comparative pluralism. 
Part V.C identifies the personal appeal of comparative pluralism by 
closely examining Cohen’s article, How We Bought the United 
States,297 which Cohen wrote in support of the ICCA. How We Bought 
the United States replaced the fiction of conquest with a contractual 
approach, assigning an active role to Indian tribes in determining 
and protecting their collective rights. By accentuating historical ex-
changes between Indians and non-Indians, Cohen intended to defend 
the history of race relations in America against comparisons to totali-
tarianism. By encouraging dialogue between distinct value systems, 
comparative pluralism was indeed Cohen’s alternative to totalitari-
anism. In the postwar years, Cohen, once again, found proof for the 
feasibility of his pluralist ideal on Indian reservations. 
V.   “EVERYTHING HAS TWO HANDLES”: COMPARATIVE PLURALISM AND 
THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION ACT, 1946 
A.   Indian Claims 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, Indian tribes had lost most of 
their lands to non-Indian settlement. Because the United States as a 
sovereign could not be sued until it waived its privilege, Indian tribes 
could not protect their lands in courts. The establishment of the 
Court of Claims in 1855298 did little to change the situation, as an 
1863 provision removed from its jurisdiction all claims arising out of 
treaties with the Indians.299 In the early twentieth century, as more 
and more tribes pressed for a resolution of their claims, Congress 
passed a series of special acts granting the Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion to hear individual tribes’ cases. Congress did not rule on these 
cases. Rather, it waived sovereign immunity and allowed individual 
tribes to bring their claims.300 
 In 1928, the Meriam Report301 recommended the establishment of 
a fairer and more efficient device to resolve Indian claims.302 In its 
third title, the original draft of the IRA had aimed to prohibit future 
land allotments and to restore to tribal ownership those lands which 
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had been declared surplus under the respective allotment acts but 
were never settled. In 1945, when William A. Brophy took office as 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he declared as one of his goals the 
creation of a tribunal for hearing and determining Indian land claims 
against the federal government.303 Cohen assisted Brophy in securing 
the passage of the ICCA in the late summer of 1946 and the estab-
lishment of the Indian Claims Commission;304 the Commission was 
patterned after the Pueblo Land Board.305 For Cohen, its intellectual 
and legal roots were the IRA’s endorsement of distributive sover-
eignty and the Handbook’s discussion of inherent sovereignty. 
 Throughout the early 1940s, Cohen paved the way for the ICCA. 
In 1941, he helped to secure the land rights of the Walapai Indians 
against the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company.306 In 1942, he as-
sisted in protecting the fishing rights of the Yakima Indians.307 After 
the war, the time was ripe for bringing a closure to Indian land 
claims against the federal government. Different policy tides made 
the passage of the ICCA possible. Many legislators thought that the 
resolution of Indian claims would help the termination process by 
removing “a major barrier to federal withdrawal,”308 and by promot-
ing the economic self-sufficiency of tribes that would receive awards. 
Some supported the adjudication of Indian claims as a matter of 
fairness to the Indians.309 Cohen’s hopes were with them. 
 Cohen envisioned an act that would provide “creative solutions” to 
tribal claims.310 In his view, the ICCA was a direct challenge to the 
absolute sovereignty of the federal government. Given their inherent 
sovereignty, as he defined it in Powers of Indian Tribes and in the 
Handbook,311 Cohen believed that Indian tribes were on a par with 
the federal government; hence, their ability to sell their lands and to 
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sue when the government failed to fulfill its obligations according to 
the terms of the sale.312 
 In reality, the remedies provided by the ICCA were limited. While 
public announcements declared that all Indian claims would receive 
serious consideration, the Act imposed strict limitations on the 
remedies that the Commission could offer.313 The ICCA provided only 
for “the fair market value of the land at the time of the taking, with-
out interest, and it could not restore land to Indians under any cir-
cumstances.”314 Despite a flood of cases (over 600 had been docketed 
by 1951), “in 1959 only $17.1 million in restitution had been paid, 
and throughout the 1960s, the average award was approximately 
$500,000.”315 In part, changes in federal Indian policy and in the per-
sonnel of the Department of the Interior determined the fate of the 
ICCA.316 Indeed, when he drafted the Act, Cohen was already caught 
between the pressing needs of bringing justice to Indian tribes, on 
the one hand, and not alienating Congress, on the other.317  
 Part V.B elaborates Cohen’s intellectual reasons for believing that 
the ICCA would benefit the Indians. It shows that for Cohen, the es-
tablishment of an investigatory commission to hear and determine 
tribal land claims against the federal government was symbolic. By 
recognizing Indian tribes’ voices, Cohen believed that the Commis-
sion would illustrate the importance of agency and the possibility of 
dialogue between and among distinct legal systems; it would endorse 
his developing ideal of comparative pluralism. As Part V.C demon-
strates, when he drafted the ICCA, Cohen, the Jewish American, 
needed to believe in the possibility of dialogue and coexistence. 
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B.   Comparative Pluralism 
 Like his ideal of systematic pluralism, Cohen’s comparative plu-
ralism embraced the plurality of value systems, but rather than forc-
ing them into one encompassing mass, it focused on the possibility of 
communication, dialogue, and translation between and among dis-
tinct systems. The understanding of any proposition “in the context 
of its own field,” Cohen would write in the early 1950s, would allow 
individuals to “translate the proposition into language that will con-
vey the same informational content in any other value field [they] 
understand.”318 This, he further explained, would allow individuals 
not only “to uncover the inarticulate value premises” of themselves 
and of others, but also “to understand the similarities and dissimi-
larities that exist between any two value perspectives,” and thus to 
become more tolerant of “cultural diversities.”319 
 The possibility of translation (and dialogue) depended, however, 
on human agency. The main drawback both of the IRA and of the 
Handbook was indeed their reliance, apparent in many pluralist pro-
jects, on humanistic experts—dedicated to democracy and the decen-
tralization of bureaucratic power—to lead the transformation toward 
a pluralist society.320 More recently, Vine Deloria has similarly noted 
that even under the supervision of the “pro-Indian” Department of 
the Interior, the Handbook did not always “represent a neutral or 
even pro-Indian point of view.”321 “People in those days,” Deloria ex-
plained, “simply could not understand that racial minorities, espe-
cially Indians, would have their own interpretation of historical 
events and legal rights.”322 Many “important interpretations of policy 
development, statutes, and case law,” according to Deloria, retained 
“a definite federal bias in that no question [was] ever raised as to 
whether federal action [sic] were proper or whether or not the federal 
government violated previously agreed upon principles of the federal-
Indian relationship.”323 
 In the mid-1940s, however, the intellectual faith in experts and, 
more broadly, in the social sciences declined.324 The strength of 
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American democracy, Cohen wrote then, was in the recognition that 
government was not “a matter of wisdom, technique, or efficiency,” 
but “a matter of right,” a right which depended upon diverse human 
purposes.325 Government, in short, was “a matter chiefly of human 
purpose” and each person was “a more faithful champion of his own 
purposes than any expert.”326 Though, as Cohen also noted, govern-
mental power often created “in its holders aspirations that [con-
flicted] with those of the rest of society.”327 
 In retrospect, Cohen disavowed his initial assessment of the en-
thusiasm in the Department of the Interior.328 He suggested that the 
faith in expertise, which prevented Indian self-government, amplified 
and was augmented by what Ralph Barton Perry (Cohen’s mentor at 
Harvard) labeled “the egocentric predicament”—that is, the fact that 
each person views the world “through his own eyes and from his own 
position,” and finds it difficult, without “a certain amount of sophisti-
cation to realize that the vision of others who see the world from dif-
ferent perspectives is just as valid . . . .”329 In the mid-1940s, Cohen 
suggested that the “bureaucratic mind” lacked such sophistication.330 
Each division in the Department—that is, Education, Forestry, 
Credit, and Law and Order—Cohen argued in 1949, was in favor of 
self-government in general, but opposed to it in the field over which 
the division itself had jurisdiction. Experts, he explained, were reluc-
tant to give up control over matters with which they were concerned, 
especially when they disagreed with tribal decisions. To protect 
against the possibility that such tribal decisions would become law 
on the reservations, these experts imposed limits on self-
government.331 
 Expertise, Cohen’s analysis implied, could not cultivate tolerance. 
Instead, his writings in the mid-1940s emphasized the ability of indi-
viduals and groups to actualize their destiny. “The most important 
task” of his generation, Cohen wrote in 1945, was “that of finding 
patterns by which men who differ in race, religion, and economic out-
look may live in peace and contribute to each other’s prosperity.”332 
Yet, while in the Handbook Cohen envisioned the sovereign state as 
the force behind social integration,333 in 1949 he suggested that it 
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was not “the business of the Indian Bureau or of any other federal 
agency to integrate Indians or Jews or Catholics or Negroes or Holy 
Rollers or Jehovah’s Witnesses into the rest of the population as a so-
lution of the Indian, Jewish, Negro, or Catholic problem, or any other 
problem.”334 It was, nonetheless, the duty of the federal government 
“to respect the right of any group to be different so long as it [did] not 
violate the criminal law.”335 
 Seemingly subtle, the shift in Cohen’s rhetoric—from social inte-
gration to the promulgation of a group right to be different—is im-
portant. As he described them in his writings during the early 1940s, 
groups had little active role in the act of social integration. The prem-
ise, which many pluralists shared, that identity was socially (if not 
biologically) determined, often implied that the individual and the 
group were social constructs, stripped of any notion of volition or 
human agency, whose interests were protected by the government. 
Instead, Cohen’s comparative pluralism, which focused on dialogue 
between distinct value systems, emphasized action. Individuals and 
groups were active agents; they shaped their own destiny and the 
destiny of others. Though Cohen fully articulated his ideal of com-
parative pluralism only in the late 1940s, its seeds were planted in 
his work on the ICCA. 
 Cohen believed that by waiving sovereign immunity and allowing 
Indian tribes to sue the federal government, the Indian Claims 
Commission would give Indian tribes an active voice in the present. 
The voices of Indian tribes, seemingly missing from the Handbook, 
were amplified in Cohen’s hopes for the ICCA. As the proof of title 
would often require the testimony of Indians and their experts, 
rather than authorities external to the tribes, Cohen hoped that the 
Commission would provide a forum for Indian tribes and individual 
Indians to tell their side of American history. According to Cohen, 
the investigatory commission was thus to operate not “on a purely le-
gal level”; it was “to operate as an administrative agency empowered 
to reach a just solution within broad limits established by law.”336 In 
his opinion, it was sufficient that Indians proved their aboriginal ti-
tle to claim damages; they did not need to show a title recognized by 
the federal government.337 The Commission, Cohen assumed, would 
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address “all Indian claims, legal, equitable and moral.”338 If the IRA 
set out to refute the antiquated policy of assimilation, and the Hand-
book was about history, the Indian Claims Commission, Cohen be-
lieved, would rewrite the future by telling a different narrative; it 
would give Indian tribes a forum to voice their versions of American 
history. 
 By providing Indian tribes with a forum to tell their side of 
American history, Cohen also believed that the Indian Claims Com-
mission would encourage dialogue. In his view, its proceedings were 
to become exercises in hearing and learning from the testimony of 
the other. By investigating “the entire field of Indian claims, even for 
those tribes which may be too poor to hire their own lawyers,” Cohen 
hoped that the Commission would “conclude once and for all this 
chapter of our national history,”339 while simultaneously calling at-
tention to it. The legal remedy was meant to bring closure. Yet, it 
was also intended to memorialize a different historical narrative. At 
least in the eyes of its drafter, the last product of the Indian New 
Deal was a genuine attempt to use law as a tool of reconciliation and 
commemoration. Cohen hoped that the Commission would settle his-
torical acts of political and cultural violence between particular 
groups while reconstructing new memories, upon which they could 
build a pluralistic present.340 
 Thus described, Cohen’s hopes for the ICCA seem both ambitious 
and extremely naive. A more cynical viewer would describe Cohen’s 
aims as either blind to the realities of federal Indian law, or as excus-
ing colonization. That the interests of Indian tribes were ultimately 
impaired supports such charges. Yet, as Part V.C suggests, in the 
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mid-1940s, Cohen wanted to believe that the Commission would 
benefit Indian tribes;341 personally, he needed to believe in the possi-
bility of dialogue and coexistence. Determined to assert the feasibil-
ity of his ideal of comparative pluralism, Cohen found evidence to 
support it in the history of race relations in America. Like the IRA 
and the Handbook that preceded it, the ICCA, in short, reflected a 
set of personal and intellectual goals. Unfortunately, the interests of 
Indian tribes were often lost in this web. 
C.   “How We Bought the United States”: The ICCA in Perspective 
 In January of 1946—anticipating the passage of the ICCA in the 
late summer of 1946—Cohen published an article that baffled his col-
leagues. Titled How We Bought the United States,342 it stressed the 
“historic fact . . . that practically all of the real estate acquired by the 
United States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any 
other emperor or czar but from its original Indian owners.”343 In a 
paragraph that was omitted in the original publication Cohen em-
phasized that the record of dealings with Indians had its dark pages. 
Americans had driven “hard Yankee bargains;” they often did not 
make the payments they promised; they did not always respect the 
boundaries of lands that the Indians reserved to themselves or other 
promises they made to the Indians in return for their land. Yet, 
Cohen stressed, whenever Congress was apprised of such deviations, 
“it [had] generally been willing to submit to court decisions the 
claims of any injured Indian tribe. And . . . to make whatever restitu-
tion the facts supported for wrongs committed by blundering or un-
faithful public servants.”344 No nation, Cohen proclaimed, had “set for 
itself so high a standard of dealing with a native aboriginal people,” 
or had been “more self-critical in seeking to rectify its deviations 
from those high standards.”345  
 Many criticized Cohen for downplaying the darker side of Amer-
ica’s dealings with Indian tribes.346 “I might be disposed to wonder 
whether you have not placed too high a value upon the goods and 
services with which we have supplied the Indians in certain circum-
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stances,” Harold Ickes wrote to Cohen.347 “I wonder,” Ickes added, 
“whether you have not been too optimistic in your averments as to 
our fairness.”348 Having known Cohen to be “more disposed to dis-
cover wrongs and insist upon their being righted” than to take “a 
complaisant point of view,” Ickes concluded, nonetheless, that “the 
article was a good one.”349 “I only hope,” he noted, “that our record is 
as fair as you present it.”350 
 Ickes clearly recognized Cohen’s goals. Like the IRA and the 
Handbook, in Cohen’s view, the ICCA was meant to empower Indian 
tribes, and he employed every piece of historical evidence to support 
(or de-radicalize) its underlying assumptions—that is, the postulates 
of his ideal of comparative pluralism: agency, dialogue, and coexis-
tence. As he did when he sought to defend his socialist and system-
atic pluralism, at least on its face, Cohen wrote How We Bought the 
United States to demonstrate that his ideal of comparative pluralism 
was already an element of the reality of race relations in America. 
 In the early 1940s, the terminology of conquest advanced Cohen’s 
ideal of group rights. In the mid-1940s, however, social, political, and 
intellectual conditions made an argument about treaties more ap-
pealing. How We Bought the United States replaced the fiction of 
conquest, which the Handbook arguably promoted, with a “contrac-
tual” approach.351 If in the Handbook Cohen argued that a long line 
of conquerors recognized Indian rights, his writings in the mid-1940s 
suggested that Indians were fortunate to have their needs recorded 
in abundant treaties. The different legal rules to which tribes were 
sometimes subjected, Cohen stressed, were the fruits of treaties, con-
tracts, and statutes that Indians were able to secure from the federal 
government. The peculiar status of Indian tribes was thus not a 
diminution of full citizenship (a claim, which, according to Cohen, 
bureaucrats used to defend the erosion of such unique rights in order 
to make Indians “equal” citizens).352 Rather, it was an addition to full 
citizenship. Reiterating, with respect to treaties, the argument he 
had made in the Handbook, Cohen emphasized that without the rec-
ognition of Indian rights by earlier generations, there would have 
been no problem of Indian claims. Wrongs never create rights, he 
                                                                                                                    
 347. Letter from Harold Ickes to Felix Cohen (Jan. 17, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers, 
Box 65, Folder 1041, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale Uni-
versity. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. For a contemporary contractual approach, see the discussion of “treaty federal-
ism,” in BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 29, at 279-87. 
 352. Felix S. Cohen, Indians Are Citizens, 1 AM. INDIAN 12 (1944), reprinted in THE 
LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 6, at 253. Excerpts were reprinted in WALTER M. DANIELS, 
AMERICAN INDIANS 103-07 (Reference Shelf Series 29, no. 4, 1957). 
2001]  AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM 259 
 
wrote. Indeed, according to Cohen, there was “no problem of Negro 
Claims for the uncompensated labors of two and one-half centuries of 
slavery, because the Negroes had no legal rights during the period of 
slavery.”353 The fact that Indian claims were considered a “problem” 
thus indicated not only that wrongs had been committed against In-
dians, but also “that Indians [had] always occupied a high and pro-
tected position in the law of the land.”354 
 It is easy to challenge Cohen’s simplistic theory of race rela-
tions.355 It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Cohen was 
oblivious to the darker side of the relationship between Indians and 
non-Indians. He wanted his audience to recognize, nonetheless, that 
throughout American history, Indians were neither slaves nor vic-
tims; they were active agents, indeed sovereign peoples, with histo-
ries, traditions, and legal systems of their own, coexisting with the 
American system. They accepted the presence of non-Indians, they 
were capable of dealing with them, and they protected their own in-
terests. In Cohen’s opinion, the fact that Indians were able to deal 
with American settlers also suggested that dialogue and translation 
between different systems were possible—that comparative plural-
ism was feasible. When he wrote How We Bought the United States, I 
wish now to suggest, Cohen needed to believe that the ICCA merely 
revived an age-old tradition, a tradition premised on coexistence. 
 Cohen’s work in the mid-1940s was informed by his concerns 
about the events in Europe and their potential ramifications in the 
United States. Throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, Cohen 
saw what he described as “[t]he common beliefs that have held us to-
gether as a nation, the moral and intellectual foundations of our de-
mocracy” being “subjected . . . to sustained attacks from totalitarian 
quarters.”356 Cohen’s different interpretations of pluralism offered in-
ternal critiques of the American way of life. Yet, like many Jewish 
intellectuals, Cohen was determined to rebut comparisons between 
the history of race relations in America and totalitarianism in 
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Europe. In a series of articles that he published in the early 1940s, 
and in a handbook on totalitarian propaganda357 that he coauthored 
with several colleagues, Cohen thus called attention to the great 
American democratic achievements in the field of minority rights. 
“The propaganda assaults of Nazism, Fascism and Communism 
have been skillfully organized and lavishly financed,” Cohen wrote 
in the foreword to Combating Totalitarian Propaganda.358 “With 
complete disregard for the canons of ordinary decency and honesty, 
the purveyors of totalitarian propaganda have insidiously and per-
sistently sought to undermine loyalty to the American way of 
life.”359 Ironically, in an effort to combat totalitarian propaganda, 
Cohen’s writings on the ICCA similarly ventured into propagandist 
aims. 
 “I have written up the story of ‘How we Bought the United 
States,’” Cohen wrote to the editors of Collier’s, “in not too technical 
terms and illustrated the piece with a map of the United States 
showing the various Indian cessions.”360 Amidst growing concerns 
about the treatment of minority groups, Cohen noted, he wanted to 
call attention to “the story of our land dealings with the Indians,” 
especially since most Americans were “quite unfamiliar with the 
basic facts on this subject and accept[ed] without question the myth 
that Indian land rights were ruthlessly disregarded in the growth of 
our country.”361 
 Publishing the piece, Cohen believed, should help in the war 
against totalitarian propaganda. “Possibly,” he wrote to John Col-
lier, who was then at the United Nations Assembly in England, 
“this piece will help you, as an American diplomat abroad, to live 
down the bad name of the United States in the field of native af-
fairs.”362 At least, Cohen hoped, it would refute the assertions of 
“Jap, Nazi and Fascist propagandists [who] lost no time in pointing 
out that what their countries were doing in Asia, Africa and Europe 
was no different from what the United States did years ago in tak-
ing a continent from the Indians in the name of a superior race.”363 
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“This is the way so much else about Indians and about all dependent 
peoples could be put across,” Collier replied with approval.364 
 Cohen aimed his work not only at totalitarian propagandists out-
side the United States, but also at those who voiced racial antago-
nism—against Indians, blacks, Jews, or any other cultural group—in 
America. Asserting that the ideals of the American Revolution guar-
anteed to Indians equal citizenship, Cohen concluded that discrimi-
nation against them, as well as against other groups, deviated from 
American standards.  
 Cohen well knew that the ideals he ascribed to American life were 
not always carried out. “I probably overstated the high standards 
embodied in our treaties and statutes,” he confessed to Ickes, and the 
omission of darker paragraphs by the editors created an even more 
exaggerated picture.365 Perhaps, he added, “twelve years among the 
bureaucrats have made me less astute to criticize our Indian record 
than I should be.”366 His goal, Cohen admitted, was to counteract op-
position to “righting Indian wrongs,” objections that were often 
founded “on the mistaken idea that we have consistently robbed the 
Indians of all they owned and that laying down any higher standard 
of public conduct now would be unprecedented, revolutionary, and 
terribly expensive.”367 “[B]y bringing to public attention some of the 
better side of our Indian dealings,” he hoped to put the “program . . . 
for general Indian claims legislation in a more appealing setting.”368 
At any rate, Cohen emphasized: 
[I]n my own dealings with Congressmen and others in public life I 
have found much illumination in a saying of Epictetus: “Every-
thing has two handles: one by which it may be borne, another by 
which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on 
the affair by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be 
borne; but rather by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he 
was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it as it is to 
be borne.”369 
 Perhaps, Cohen concluded his letter to Ickes, “even an over-
optimistic commentary on the high standards set by our Indian legis-
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lation may prove helpful in arousing critical attention to lapses from 
those standards.”370 
 Cohen’s hopes were transparent. With the events in Europe, on 
the one hand, and growing opposition to federal Indian policy, on the 
other hand, Cohen wanted Americans to adopt his ideal of compara-
tive pluralism as the only alternative to totalitarianism. As early as 
1924, Horace Kallen indicated that “[t]he alternative before Ameri-
cans [was] Kultur Klux Klan or Cultural Pluralism.”371 The latter, ac-
cording to Kallen, was possible “only in a democratic society whose 
institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in tem-
peraments, whose program liberates these individualities and guides 
them into a fellowship of freedom and cooperation.”372 Faced with to-
talitarianism in Europe and growing critiques of the Indian New 
Deal at home, Kallen’s pointed alternative became for Cohen a mat-
ter of life and death. He needed to believe that Americans had al-
ready chosen between Kallen’s alternatives—that they preferred cul-
tural pluralism, or what he developed into comparative pluralism, to 
Kultur Klux Klan, and democracy to totalitarianism. 
 Establishing American standards was the aim both of How We 
Bought the United States and of the ICCA. In a world where victims 
were many, where force and violence abundant, where genocide be-
came an aspect of modernity, the preservation of diverse cultures 
seemed the only alternative to total annihilation. The original own-
ers of America, who reached agreements to preserve their traditions 
with the immigrants to the new world, proved, in Cohen’s view, the 
feasibility of his ideal of comparative pluralism, an ideal that en-
dorsed cultural pluralism not as a separatist ideology, but as grounds 
for dialogue and inclusion. By emphasizing the success of earlier cul-
tural dialogues, Cohen hoped to provide an incentive for agreements 
in postwar America: between “whites” and “reds”; between old in-
habitants and European immigrants; and maybe even globally. In 
the aftermath of World War II, in short, Indian tribes taught Cohen 
what he rejected in 1933, but was willing to admit in 1946—that the 
preservation of cultural traditions, one’s own and others, was liberat-
ing.373 
 Unfortunately, Cohen’s new pluralistic ideal stood in sharp con-
trast to what was happening after the war in the Department of the 
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Interior. It would be futile to assess whether Cohen’s failure to admit 
this contrast, and include in the ICCA legal mechanisms to address 
it, cost Indian tribes some of their land claims. Instead, as Part VI 
suggests, we may wish to use Cohen’s encounters with pluralism to 
reflect on our own attempts to devise a plural polity. 
VI.   BEYOND THE INDIAN NEW DEAL 
 Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, pluralists, as 
Cohen’s story manifests, struggled to mediate the tensions between 
their situated frames of reference, their dreams and aspirations, and 
their pluralist epistemology. Due to the unique personnel composi-
tion of the Department of the Interior,374 the Indian New Deal 
reached further than any other experiment in transforming theories 
of pluralism into real life reform. Despite their faults, the legislative 
and administrative products of the Indian New Deal made significant 
contributions to federal Indian law. The IRA recognized the impor-
tance of self-government, the Handbook sought to empower the legal 
and cultural traditions of Indian tribes, and the ICCA aimed to cre-
ate a forum where Indians could challenge common American myths 
and tell their versions of American history. The onset of the Cold 
War, however, brought the Indian New Deal under direct attack. 
 The Indian New Deal was grounded in a viable critique of the 
American way of life and offered a plausible formula for reform. Its 
orientation toward the group, however, rendered it foreign on the soil 
of liberal America. As the Cold War spurred mounting attacks on 
anything remotely socialist (let alone communist), “Making ‘Reds’ of 
the Indians” was no longer a symbol of reform. It was seen as a 
threat to American ideals. Beginning in the 1940s, the IRA was criti-
cized as “promoting communistic tendencies and imposing an un-
wanted primitive tribal state on developing Indians who desired to 
assimilate.”375 Instead of “a device for Indians to rebuild their shat-
tered communities through local, tribal economic and political or-
ganizations,” the Indian New Deal was rapidly seen as “an impedi-
ment toward Indian economic and political assimilation.”376 
 Gradually, pressure increased to abolish the special status of In-
dian tribes. The desire to obtain Indian lands and resources, objec-
tions to Indian religious practices, and the depiction of the Indian 
New Deal as “socialistic” buttressed the argument that the federal 
government should discontinue its role as trustee of Indians’ prop-
erty. Protective guardianship, it was argued, could be detrimental to 
individual welfare. “Development of the property to full utilization 
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and encouragement of the owner to accept responsibility for man-
agement” were offered as better goals of Indian policy.377  
 As political pressures to change federal Indian policy increased, 
the group of reformers that drafted and administered the Indian New 
Deal fell apart. Collier resigned in 1945, followed by Ickes, who left 
the Truman Cabinet in February 1946. On December 15, 1947, 
Cohen sent his letter of resignation to then Secretary of the Interior, 
Julius A. Krug.378 “You will resign when your freedom . . . is denied,” 
Norman Thomas had told Cohen back in 1933.379 In 1947, with other 
disillusioned New Deal colleagues, as well as like-minded Indians, 
Cohen came to realize that he would be able to better assist the In-
dian cause by representing tribes against the government.380 Within 
a few years, termination became official government policy, aiming to 
end the special status of Indian tribes.381 As Judith Royster has re-
cently noted, it was “assimilation with a vengeance”382: “Congress 
withdrew federal recognition, liquidated tribal assets, including the 
land base, and transferred jurisdiction over Indians to the states. 
The loss of tribal territory and sovereignty was immediate and com-
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plete.”383 In 1958, five years after Cohen’s untimely death, a new ver-
sion of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law eradicated the plural-
istic characteristics of the original edition; instead, it suggested that 
Indians were wards of the state.384 
 The 1950s also witnessed the emergence of a new theory of plural-
ism: a descriptive social theory purportedly with no ethical convic-
tion. It was inspired, as Edward Purcell showed, by a rejection of all 
absolutism including any morally based pleas for social reform. The 
American ideal of democracy became a balancing theory. America 
was composed of interest groups, and group conflict reflected the dis-
persal of political power. Furthermore, the delicate balance between 
groups was presumed to be preserved by existing political institu-
tions and cultural consensus, a “consensus rooted in the common life, 
habits, institutions, and experience of generations.”385 The status quo 
became a normative theory.386 Instead of seeking policies that would 
promote diverse interests, scholars directed their efforts toward find-
ing a “morality of process” independent of results. Robert Dahl’s in-
terest group pluralism was the ultimate example.387 
 Interest group pluralism sought to evade the pluralist dilemma, 
that is, the need to determine the normative limits of a commitment 
to pluralism. On the one hand, to allow the state to exercise power 
over diverse groups risked imposing one’s own, concededly partial in-
terests and beliefs, in the name of a general, public good. On the 
other hand, the alternative of deferring to groups risked moral rela-
tivism, maybe even nihilism.388 At least since Oliver Wendell Holmes 
challenged the description of law as a body of natural and neutral 
rules,389 legal scholars had struggled with this dilemma. Faced with 
diverse social and cultural interests, and hence with a variety of vi-
sions of what law ought—as a social and political matter—to be, 
many adopted one system of beliefs and treated it as the primary 
guiding light in their analysis of law. In the 1930s, many legal real-
ists, for example, offered some form of “policy analysis” assuming 
that “there were correct—liberal—answers to the hot legal questions 
of the day but that conservative judges couldn’t be expected to reach 
                                                                                                                    
 383. Id.; see also Walch, supra note 377, at 1182-86. 
 384. 1958 HANDBOOK, supra note 33. 
 385. PURCELL, supra note 284, at 255. 
 386. See generally id. at 253-66.  
 387. See DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 2; DAHL, PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2. 
 388. Cf. Ernst, supra note 46. 
 389. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the 
New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 991 (1997); see also HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 4, 139-42; Robert W. Gordon, The Path 
of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1997). 
266  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:189 
 
them.”390 In the 1950s, interest group pluralism, and the legal process 
school that was informed by it, adopted a different approach. Instead 
of endorsing any particular vision of the good, these process theorists 
found refuge in creating conceptions of neutral processes in which 
different groups supposedly interact, compete, and trade ends.391 This 
turn to process attracted criticism, however, from those who saw law 
as necessarily embracing substantive norms.392 More recently, critical 
legal studies, the new institutional economics, and feminist legal 
theory, to name a few, have sought to direct legal discourses toward 
substance and away from process.393 The current resurgence of for-
malism394 keeps the debates alive. In this context, Cohen’s experience 
in the New Deal is of enduring importance. 
 Inspired by early twentieth-century normative theories of plural-
ism, each of the models Cohen devised sought to accommodate diver-
sity without either promoting certain moral absolutes or succumbing 
to moral relativism. Cohen’s socialist pluralism, which informed his 
plans for the IRA, urged the distribution of sovereignty to political 
groups, including Indian tribes, as a means of encouraging group 
self-determination. His systematic pluralism, which influenced the 
writing of the Handbook, advocated the inclusion of diverse cultural 
traditions under an all-encompassing (universal) legal system. Fi-
nally, comparative pluralism, which was already reflected in Cohen’s 
hopes for the ICCA, emphasized the possibility of exchange between 
and among different value systems. Realizing that we might never be 
able to articulate a universal ideal that would endorse all particular 
systems, comparative pluralism sought to find legal mechanisms that 
would allow the coexistence of distinct value systems.  
 These models were not perfect. The IRA ended up imposing a uni-
versal structure of government on all Indian reservations. The 
Handbook neglected to acknowledge the importance of Indian voices, 
while the ICCA was hardly more than symbolic in its remedies. The 
significance of Cohen’s experience in the New Deal reaches, however, 
beyond the ultimate success or failure of the policies he devised. 
Cohen’s experience illustrates that models of pluralism and laws that 
are informed by them are sites for the construction and negotiation of 
cultural, social, and political ideologies. In siting pluralism, his story 
also illustrates how mapped in the body of law are struggles with 
identity. It further shows that even as formalistic legal structures 
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cannot accomplish the goals of accommodating diversity, pluralism 
might flourish in their peripheries. 
 Each of the models devised by Cohen reflected his changing con-
struction of “the Indian problem,” and his sense as a Jewish Ameri-
can of the tensions between particularism and universalism. Cohen’s 
attraction to socialist pluralism was motivated by his wish as a Jew-
ish American to emphasize the insignificance of racial and ethnic dif-
ferences. Informed by his experience in administering the IRA, 
Cohen came to accept the importance of diverse cultural traditions. 
Yet, consistent with his desire to be included in the polity, his sys-
tematic pluralism endorsed cultural pluralism but stressed that all 
systems would ultimately become a singular cosmopolitan whole. In 
the aftermath of World War II, Indian tribes became a symbol for the 
possibility that cultural traditions, the Jewish tradition among them, 
could be—in fact should be—cherished and preserved. Comparative 
pluralism thus celebrated cultural pluralism and embraced dialogue 
as a foundation for coexistence. 
 As if admitting his personal transformation, two years after he 
left the Department of the Interior, Cohen concluded a commentary 
on Indian self-government with the following paragraph: 
The issue we face is not the issue merely of whether Indians will 
regain their independence of spirit. Our interest in Indian self-
government today is not the interest of sentimentalists or anti-
quarians. We have a vital concern with Indian self-government be-
cause the Indian is to America what the Jew was to the Russian 
Czars and Hitler’s Germany. For us, the Indian tribe is the miners’ 
canary and when it flutters and droops we know that the poison 
gasses of intolerance threaten all other minorities in our land. And 
who of us is not a member of some minority?395 
 The “rise, fall and return of pluralism”396 in the twentieth century 
may reflect law’s inadequacy in the face of political, social, and cul-
tural chasms. Every reiteration, nonetheless, creates sites in which 
pluralism flourishes, peripheries where practice challenges theory. 
Since Cohen used it, many have turned to the image of the miners’ 
canary to illustrate the importance of tolerance. As vital is Cohen’s 
pointed question, “And who of us is not a member of some minority?” 
Because each of us is a member of some minority, our identities are 
constructed and negotiated as we seek to accommodate diversity. A 
commitment to pluralism is both political and personal. It requires 
an admission that the diverse cultural, political, economic, and social 
interests that characterize our society are grounded in multiple value 
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systems, and it requires faith in the possibility of social integration, 
inside and outside the law. This is not to suggest that the celebration 
of diversity is equivalent to an endorsement of moral relativism. In-
deed, the tensions that were reflected in the Indian New Deal—
between one’s frames of reference and one’s commitment to plural-
ism—are inherent in pluralism as a normative theory. The endorse-
ment of all pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid 
is impossible. Still, in order to devise a plural polity, in order to 
thrive, we must make diversity the starting point for reflection and 
action, and aim to discern—through dialogue and communication—
universal principles that can yield a point of view acceptable to all.397 
Our treatment of different groups (and individuals), as Cohen so 
aptly described it, is the litmus test of our democracy; it reflects “a 
set of beliefs that forms the intellectual equipment of a genera-
tion.”398 It is up to us to develop the content of such beliefs. 
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